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FLORIDA BAR v. WENT FOR IT, INC.:
REFINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD FOR EVALUATING
STATE RESTRICTIONS ON
LEGAL ADVERTISING
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
Congress may not abridge the freedom of speech.' Traditionally, the
United States Supreme Court extended the First Amendment to political,
noncommercial speech,2 but not to commercial speech.3 Indeed, in 1942,
1. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment states, in part, that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Id. The First Amendment applies to
the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating that the freedom of speech and press are "among
the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States," and disregarding as "incidental"
an earlier contrary statement by the Court); see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811
(1975) (stating that "[t]he First Amendment, of course, is applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment").
2. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (stating that the "central importance"
of the First Amendment is to protect "speech on public issues"). For a thorough examina-
tion of the arguments supporting the contention that the First Amendment was intended to
protect only political speech, see Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial
Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 6-14 (1979)
(arguing that the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect certain identifiable values,
in particular, "effective self-government," and possibly the opportunity for "individual self-
fulfillment through free expression," and that state regulation of commercial speech impli-
cates neither of these values). See generally C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Prob-
lem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) (arguing that commercial
speech should be denied any First Amendment protection because the freedom of speech
protects the individual's right to self expression, and speech motivated by profit "lacks the
crucial connections with individual liberty and self-realization"); Ronald K.L. Collins &
David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 736-45 (1993)
(arguing that modern commercial communications do not deserve First Amendment pro-
tection); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1225-51 (1983) (analyz-
ing the First Amendment theories of Jackson and Jeffries, supra, and Baker, supra).
Others, however, contend that First Amendment protection should extend to commer-
cial speech. See generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-His-
tory of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993) [hereinafter Kozinski & Banner,
Anti-History] (responding to Collins & Skover, supra); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner,
Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628 (1990) [hereinafter Kozinski
& Banner, Who's Afraid] (arguing that the law should not distinguish between commercial
and noncommercial speech); Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First
Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777,
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the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the First Amendment did not
protect commercial speech.4 Over the next thirty years, however, the
780 (1993) (responding to Collins & Skover, supra, and arguing that the First Amendment
should protect mass advertising); David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of
Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 411-29 (1990) (arguing that commercial speech
promotes rational decision-making and self-realization).
Proponents of the foregoing arguments have agreed that the Framers' intent in drafting
the First Amendment is, at best, unclear. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) (stating that "[t]he framers seem to
have had no coherent theory of free speech" and their debates at the Constitutional Con-
vention "do not tell us what the men who adopted the first amendment intended"); Kozin-
ski & Banner, Who's Afraid, supra, at 634 (stating that "[t]he first amendment's text and
history don't provide us with any explanation of the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech").
3. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 483 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that the First Amendment traditionally has not protected "the actual market-
place of purely commercial transactions from governmental regulation"); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect
"purely commercial advertising"); see also Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Pro-
tection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720, 722 (1982) (stating that
"[t]raditional first amendment jurisprudence held commercial speech to be wholly unwor-
thy of protection").
Commercial speech has been defined as "speech which does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction."' Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). Commercial speech also has been defined
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). For
a discussion of the Court's varying definitions of commercial speech, see generally Kozin-
ski and Banner, Who's Afraid, supra note 2, at 638-48 (providing examples of noncommer-
cial speech and highlighting definitional difficulties); Elisabeth A. Langworthy, Note, Time,
Place, or Manner Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 127, 128 n.1
(1983) (outlining the Court's varying definitions of commercial speech); McGowan, supra
note 2, at 400-02 (arguing that the Supreme Court has defined commercial speech inade-
quately because the Court emphasizes the speaker's motive and not the content of the
speech); Thomas W. Merrill, Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Ad-
vertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 222-36 (1976) (describ-
ing the difficulties involved in defining commercial speech); Nadir N. Tawil, Comment,
Commercial Speech: A Proposed Definition, 27 How. L.J. 1015, 1026-30 (1984) (discussing
the Court's commercial speech definitions and proposing that commercial speech be de-
fined as "an expression designed primarily to promote a commercial product, service, or a
business interest").
4. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 52. Without explanation or citation to legal precedent,
the Supreme Court held in Chrestensen that the First Amendment does not protect "purely
commercial advertising." Id. at 54. The Court stated that legislatures may decide the ex-
tent to which "one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets." Id. For a
brief discussion of the Court's early commercial speech cases, see generally Martin H. Red-
ish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 448-58 (1971); Barry S. Roberts, Toward a Gen-
eral Theory of Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 116-26
(1979) (analyzing the Court's evolving approach to commercial speech from Chrestensen
through Bigelow v. Virginia); Weinberg, supra note 3, at 722-24 (describing the Court's
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Court gradually retreated from that holding5 and, in 1976, finally ex-
tended First Amendment protection to commercial speech. 6 Nonethe-
less, commercial speech does not receive complete First Amendment
protection.7 Generally, governmental restrictions on commercial speech
treatment of commercial speech from Chrestensen to Bigelow and arguing that the Court
increasingly looked at the content of the speech when evaluating First Amendment chal-
lenges to state-imposed restrictions).
5. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 758-61 (describing the evolution of
the Court's treatment of commercial speech since Chrestensen). Nearly two decades
before the Court decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Justice Douglas had criticized
.Chrestensen as "casual, almost offhand," and remarked that "it has not survived reflec-
tion." Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Further, in Bigelow, the Court characterized Chrestensen's holding as limited and stated
that Chrestensen did not mean that all regulation of commercial advertising is "immune
from constitutional challenge." Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819-20. For a discussion of the
Court's abandonment of its ruling in Chrestensen, see Daniel A. Farber, Commercial
Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 376-79 (1979); Roberts,
supra note 4, at 116-26 (describing the evolution of the Court's treatment of commercial
speech after Chrestensen).
6. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (concluding that, under the First
Amendment, pharmacists could advertise prescription drug prices). The Court's holding in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy has been the subject of much critical and favorable com-
mentary. See Baker, supra note 2, at 41-54 (criticizing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy as
"unprincipled, or contrary to the dominant theory of first amendment rights" because the
Court (1) rejected a "liberty-oriented model of the first amendment" in favor of an eco-
nomic theory; (2) eliminated the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech; (3) adopted a balancing test; and (4) found that the state failed to assert a substan-
tial interest); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 2, at 14-25 (arguing that Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy cannot be explained under traditional First Amendment principles because
commercial speech is insignificant and does not promote "individual self-fulfillment" or
"contribute to political decisionmaking in a representative democracy"); Roberts, supra
note 4, at 126-32 (arguing that, while commercial speech is entitled to less protection than
noncommercial speech, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy fails to answer which forms of
commercial speech should be fully protected); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Commercial
Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080, 1096-101 (applauding the
Court's decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy because it promotes more rational
decisionmaking and prevents states from secretly protecting discrete economic interests);
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 142, 149-52 (1976) (describing Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy and stating that it does not resolve questions regarding (1) how to
distinguish between speech that is entitled to full protection and speech that should receive
less protection, and (2) how existing bans on legal advertising should be treated).
7. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24 (stating that "common-
sense differences" between commercial and noncommercial speech entitle them to "differ-
ent degree[s] of protection"); see Roberts, supra note 4, at 126-32 (analyzing the Court's
decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and arguing that the Court's "commonsense
differences" distinction marked the first time that speech was accorded reduced protection
because of its content). The Court did not elaborate on the level of protection appropriate
for commercial speech until 1980 in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Court stated that if commercial
speech is not misleading or does not involve an illegal activity, the state must justify restric-
tions on such speech by asserting a substantial state interest and demonstrating that the
restriction directly advances that state interest and is "narrowly drawn." Id. at 564-65
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must be narrowly tailored8 and must directly advance a substantial state
interest.9
(quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978)). This degree of protection has been char-
acterized as an "intermediate level of scrutiny." Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Ed-
enfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993); see also Smolla, supra note 2, at 791 n.57
(describing Central Hudson's test as "less rigorous" than strict scrutiny because, unlike
strict scrutiny, Central Hudson requires the state to demonstrate merely a substantial, not
compelling, interest, and because the state is not required to choose the least restrictive
means of achieving its goal). For early criticism of the Central Hudson test, see The
Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 159, 164-68 (1980) (arguing that the stan-
dard set forth in Central Hudson, which would permit narrowly tailored content-based
restrictions on accurate commercial speech, is inconsistent with First Amendment princi-
ples that justify protecting other forms of speech). See-generally Arlen W. Langvardt, Sec-
tion 43(a), Commercial Falsehood, and the First Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78
MINN. L. REV. 309, 371-76 (1993) (describing Central Hudson and how the Court has mod-
ified the standard set forth therein). See also infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text
(discussing Central Hudson).
8. Compare Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (stating that "if the governmental inter-
est could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the exces-
sive restrictions cannot survive") and In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (requiring
restrictions to be "narrowly drawn" and stating that the "[s]tate lawfully may regulate only
to the extent regulation furthers the State's substantial interest") with Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (rejecting the requirement that a governmental restriction be
the "least restrictive means" and requiring only a reasonable fit between the governmental
regulation and the interest sought to be advanced). For a discussion of the Court's modifi-
cation of Central Hudson's "narrowly tailored" requirement, see Smolla, supra note 2. at
791 n.57 (explaining that in Fox, the Court clarified that the fit between the legislature's
ends and means must only be reasonable, not perfect); Langvardt, supra note 7, at 374-76
(arguing that the Court's test has been weakened by subsequent decisions requiring only a
reasonable fit between a legislature's ends and means); Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment,
Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's
Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1950-69 (1992) (arguing that the Court's decisions in
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1985), and Fox lowered
the level of scrutiny established in Central Hudson from an intermediate to a rational basis
level and analyzing lower court cases that have been decided subsequent to Posadas and
Fox); McGowan, supra note 2, at 380 (stating that the Court now permits a "looser fit"
between a statute and its stated objective).
9. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. Among the myriad state interests that have been
deemed substantial are (1) conserving energy, id. at 568; (2) maintaining standards of li-
censed professionals, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978); Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1995); (3) preventing solicitation that in-
volves "fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious
conduct,"' Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462; (4) protecting the privacy and tranquility of the home,
Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376; and most recently, (5) preserving the reputation of the legal
profession, id. But see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647-48
(1985) (stating that the state has a substantial interest in ensuring dignified behavior in the
court room, but that the state's interest in protecting the dignity of the lawyer's communi-
cations with the public was not substantial enough to justify restricting his free speech
rights under the First Amendment). See generally John T. Ballantine, Jr., Comment, After
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association: Much Remains Unresolved About the Allowable
Limits of Restrictions on Attorney Advertising, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 142-43 (1990)
Legal Advertising
The Court first extended limited First Amendment protection to com-
mercial speech involving price advertising of standardized products,' ° but
reserved the question of whether the First Amendment protected adver-
tising of professional services. 1' In 1977, the Court ruled for the first time
that professional advertising by lawyers was protected speech under the
First Amendment. 2 Since then, when considering the constitutionality of
(discussing the Court's analysis of asserted state interests in cases involving restrictions on
attorney advertising).
10. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976). The Court characterized the constitutionally protected ad-
vertisement as "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price." Id. at 761. In a
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the Court's holding was limited
to pharmacists' ability to advertise prices for prepackaged drugs. Id. at 773-74 (Burger,
C.J., concurring); see infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy).
11. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. The Court explained that
doctors and lawyers "do not dispense standardized products." Id. Rather, members of the
medical and legal professions provide an "infinite variety" of professional services, and
advertising for such services presents the "enhanced possibility for confusion and decep-
tion." Id.; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 391 (1977) (distinguishing
advertising for tangible products from advertising for legal services on the basis that the
latter presents a much higher potential for deception and greater regulatory difficulties)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor also has sounded
this theme in her opinions dissenting from the Court's decisions invalidating state-imposed
restrictions on legal advertising. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 674, 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing the diversity and complexity of professional
services as compared to standardized products and arguing that the Court should defer to
state regulation of the professions); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 487
(1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (contending that one of the fundamental problems in the
Court's legal advertising cases is the "defective analogy between professional services and
standardized consumer products").
12. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (holding that a state may not prohibit lawyers from printing
a truthful advertisement that lists the availability and prices of routine legal services).
The history of proscriptions on a lawyer's ability to advertise and solicit can be traced to
eighteenth-century England where young wealthy barristers learned the law and perceived
its practice to be a public service, not a trade. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICs 210
(1953). See generally John B. Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England and the United
States, 32 AM. J. CoMp. L. 493, 502-03 (1984) (stating that early American advertising
prohibitions often were "riddled with exceptions" and noting that even Abraham Lincoln
advertised); Paul H. Francis & Jennifer J. Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercing
the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLIAMEITTE L.J. 221,222-24 (1977) (stating that prohibitions on
legal advertising can be traced to ancient Rome and Greece); Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, The
Inns of Court and the Impact on the Legal Profession in England, 4 Sw. L.J. 391, 391-97
(1950) (describing the English Inns of the Court where young men have learned to practice
law since the twelfth century).
Modern restrictions on legal advertising have their roots in the American Bar Associa-
tion's (ABA) Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908. Francis & Johnson, supra, at
226. The purpose of the Canons was to promote "absolute confidence in the integrity and
impartiality" of the administration of justice through the "conduct and the motives of the
members of our profession." Preamble to the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics (1908),
reprinted in DRINKER, supra, app. C at 309. The ABA Canons did not completely prohibit
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state regulation of lawyer advertising and solicitation,' 3 the Court has
emphasized the importance of consumer access to the free flow of com-
mercial information'4 and has invalidated prophylactic prohibitions on
legal advertising, for in 1937, the Canons were redrafted to permit the use of professional
business cards. ABA Canon 27, reprinted in DRINKER, supra, at 316-17 n.6. In addition,
Canon 28 declared that "stirring up" litigation by volunteering advice and offering to bring
a lawsuit was "unprofessional," and that "hunt[ing] up" causes of action and informing
affected persons of them in order to obtain employment was "disreputable." ABA Canon
28, reprinted in DRINKER, supra, at 319. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
was adopted in 1969, and was superseded in 1983 by the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. Jim Rossi & Mollie Weighner, An Empirical Examination of the Iowa Bar's Ap-
proach to Regulating Lawyer Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 179, 188-92 (1991). For a
complete description of the Canons that addressed solicitation and advertising and how
those Canons and subsequent amendments were interpreted, see DRINKER, supra, at 215-
73. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON ADVERTISING, LAWYER
ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS: PROFESSIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 29-39 (1995)
[hereinafter ABA, CROSSROADS] (describing nineteenth century legal advertising practices
and the advent of advertising restrictions during the twentieth century); Attanasio, supra,
at 503-04 (discussing the evolution of exceptions to the advertising ban); Mylene Brooks,
Lawyer Advertising: Is There Really a Problem?, 15 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 3-10 (1994)
(providing a historical perspective on the development of proscriptions on legal advertis-
ing); Francis & Johnson, supra, at 226-36 (describing how the Canons created difficulties
for lawyers attempting to provide legal assistance to members of low income groups);
Rossi & Weighner, supra, at 188-92 (describing the 1969 Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility and how it was amended after the Supreme Court granted constitutional pro-
tection to legal advertising in Bates); Thomas E. Skowronski, Comment, Of Shibboleths,
Sense and Changing Tradition-Lawyer Advertising, 61 MARO. L. REV. 644, 647-51 (1978)
(describing the history and development of modern restrictions on legal advertising).
13. The ABA defines advertising as involving "an active quest for clients, contrary to
the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 7.2 cmt., reprinted in ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 509 (2nd ed. 1992). The ABA
describes solicitation as "direct in-person or live telephone contact by a lawyer with a pro-
spective client known to need legal services." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 7.3 cmt., reprinted in ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNO-
TATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 519 (2nd ed. 1992). Although the two
terms are similar, important distinctions exist. See Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 412 N.E.2d
927, 931 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981). In Koffler, the court discussed
some differences between advertising and solicitation:
[n]ot all solicitation is advertising, though all advertising either implicitly or ex-
plicitly involves solicitation. To 'solicit' means to move to action, to endeavor to
obtain by asking, and implies personal petition to a particular individual to do a
particular thing ... while 'advertising' is the calling of information to the atten-
tion of the public, by whatever means.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Katherine A. LaRoe, Comment, Much Ado About Barra-
try: State Regulation of Attorneys' Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1513, 1529 n.47 (1994) (explaining that, while the terms "solicitation" and "advertising"
sometimes are used interchangeably, advertising usually involves an impersonal communi-
cation to the public, while solicitation usually refers to a personalized communication be-
tween two individuals).
14. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 478-80 (reversing the Supreme Court of Kentucky's
ban on targeted direct-mail solicitations and emphasizing the importance of the free flow
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advertising that is not misleading or deceptive,' 5 or that can be regulated
of commercial information); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646-
47 (1985) (stating that access to commercial information is so important that it justifies
requiring regulators to bear the costs of distinguishing truthful, helpful, and harmless infor-
mation from that which is false, misleading, and harmful); Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75 (em-
phasizing the public's interest in having "at least some of the relevant information needed
to reach an informed decision"); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n,
496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990) (plurality opinion) (stating that the ability of states to restrict legal
advertising is limited by the "principle that disclosure of truthful, relevant information is
more likely to make a positive contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of such
information"); cf Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1978) (finding
that because in-person solicitation places pressure on a potential client to make a rushed
decision, such conduct may be inconsistent with ensuring that a potential client has an
opportunity to make an informed choice regarding legal services). See generally Thomas I.
Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (arguing that the
right to know deserves constitutional protection); Vernon R. Pearson & Michael O'Neill,
The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Advertising Lawyer, 9 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 293, 304-06 (1986) (describing briefly the Court's pre-Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy decisions recognizing a First Amendment right to receive information); Wein-
berg, supra note 3, at 733-35 (outlining the Court decisions recognizing a listener's First
Amendment interest).
15. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473-80 (ruling that a state may not prohibit an attor-
ney from sending truthful and non-deceptive letters of solicitation to potential clients who
are known to have specific legal difficulties); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647 (holding that states
may not discipline attorneys "for soliciting legal business through printed advertising con-
taining truthful and non-deceptive information and advice regarding the legal rights of
potential clients"); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 205 (1982) (holding that the following are
not misleading and, therefore, could not be prophylactically banned: (1) an advertisement
describing an attorney's practice areas in terminology not approved by the state supreme
court's rules; (2) a listing of the states in which the attorney is licensed to practice; and (3) a
statement in large capital letters that the attorney is a member of the U.S. Supreme Court
Bar); Bates, 433 U.S. at 373, 384 (refusing to find "an inherent lack of standardization in
legal services" that might render legal advertisements misleading, and holding that states
may not ban truthful advertising of routine legal services); cf. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647
(finding that the use of an accurate illustration was not likely to mislead, deceive or con-
fuse the public); In re Von Wiegen, 470 N.E.2d 838, 845 (N.Y. 1984) (finding that a com-
plete prohibition on targeted, direct-mail solicitations is not necessary because they can be
presented in a non-deceptive manner); Lyon v. Alabama State Bar, 451 So. 2d 1367, 1372
(Ala.) (holding that an advertisement that listed fees for routine services along with a dis-
claimer that the above fees did not include court costs was not misleading), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 981 (1984). Justices Powell and O'Connor have disagreed with the Court's finding
that advertising of routine services is not misleading. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 392-94 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that even apparently simple legal
services, such as divorces, often implicate more complex legal problems such as child sup-
port and custody, and that advertising is misleading if a customer thinks that an advertised
service will encompass all of his needs); Shapero, 486 U.S. at 485-86 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that an advertisement is inherently misleading if it fails to inform potential
clients that a legal service cannot be characterized as "routine" until a lawyer fully under-
stands the scope of the legal problem).
The Court in R.M.J. also found that states could not ban potentially misleading advertis-
ing if the information could be presented in a manner that was not misleading. 455 U.S. at
203. The Court found that an attorney's statement in large capital letters that he was a
member of the United States Supreme Court Bar could be potentially misleading, but that
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effectively. 6 Conversely, the Court has sustained bans on advertising
and solicitation that have a significant potential to result in overreach-
the record had made no such finding. Id. at 205-06; Peel, 496 U.S. at 106-07, 110 (plurality
opinion) (finding that a statement on letterhead indicating that the attorney is certified as a
specialist was neither actually nor inherently misleading). See generally Frederick C. Moss,
The Ethics of Law Practice Marketing, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 601, 607-41 (1986)
(describing how the ABA and various states have modified their model codes to define
"misleading" or "false" in response to the Supreme Court's decisions on legal advertising);
Douglas Whitman & Clyde D. Stoltenberg, Evolving Concepts of Lawyer Advertising: The
Supreme Court's Latest Clarification, 19 IND. L. REV. 497, 516-22 (1986) [hereinafter Whit-
man & Stoltenberg, Evolving Concepts] (discussing state court decisions defining mislead-
ing legal advertising); John Ratino, Note, In re R.M.J.: Reassessing the Extension of First
Amendment Protection to Attorney Advertising, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 729, 753-57 (1983)
(arguing that in R.M.J., the Court adopted a stricter standard for reviewing legal advertis-
ing than for other commercial speech under Central Hudson); W. Thier, Note, Peel v. At-
torney Registration & Disciplinary Commission: Allowing Claims of Certification in
Lawyer Advertising, 65 TUL. L. REV. 687, 695-96 (1991) (stating that Peel has further lim-
ited the types of advertising that can be considered misleading and arguing that the Court
appears to be urging state bar associations to implement stricter standards).
16. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476-77 (observing that states can regulate potential
abuses and mistakes in targeted, direct-mail solicitations by requiring lawyers to file sam-
ple solicitation letters with an oversight agency); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646 (placing the
burden on state regulators to distinguish truthful from false advertising); R.M.J., 455 U.S.
at 206 (invalidating a state rule restricting the persons to whom a lawyer could send profes-
sional announcements because a state can supervise an attorney's mailings by requiring
such mailings to be filed with the state reviewing agency); Peel, 496 U.S. at 109-10 (plural-
ity opinion) (invalidating a prohibition on attorneys' ability to list a certification or special-
ization and noting that states can prevent the public from being mislead or confused by
implementing screening procedures or requiring disclaimers); cf. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466-
67 (upholding a prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation in part because the activity oc-
curs in private and is not subject to oversight by either the state or the legal profession).
See generally Rossi & Weighner, supra note 12, 202-09 (outlining Iowa's approach to legal
advertising, including its direct mail advertising restrictions, which require approval by the
state regulatory agency before being mailed); Ballantine, supra note 9, at 146-51 (sug-
gesting implementation guidelines for state regulatory programs regarding direct mail so-
licitations); Brian S. Kabateck, Note, Attorney Direct-Target Mail Solicitation: Regulating
After Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 22 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 887, 942-48 (1989) (pro-
posing that states regulate direct-mail solicitations by: (1) implementing pre-approval pro-
cedures; (2) imposing mandatory disclosure requirements for all such communications; (3)
requiring that direct-mail solicitations be sent to verifiable addresses only; and (4) impos-
ing a waiting period on the mailing of solicitations to personal injury or wrongful death
victims).
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ing,' the invasion of privacy,' 8 or the exercise of undue influence or
fraud.' 9
17. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-65 (finding a greater potential for overreaching "when a
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophistica-
ted, injured, or distressed lay person"). See generally Note, Advertising, Solicitation and
the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1184 n.23
(1972) (stating that "'[o]verreaching' refers to aggressive competition among lawyers for
clients which leads to lawyers approaching clients at times when the clients are in no condi-
tion to properly consider retention of a lawyer, for example, immediately after an
accident").
18. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465 n.25 (finding that in-person solicitation by an attorney for
pecuniary gain invades a potential client's privacy because the target of the solicitation
cannot avoid the attorney's advances); cf. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371,
2381 (1995) (upholding a state ban on sending targeted, direct-mail solicitations to per-
sonal injury victims within thirty days of an accident, in part, because the public perceives
such solicitation to be an invasion of privacy). But see Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476 (finding
that a targeted, direct-mail solicitation does not invade the recipient's privacy and stating
that, if any invasion occurs, it happens when the attorney learns of a potential client's legal
affairs); see also Robert Anthony, Note, Protection for Attorney Solicitation Slow In Com-
ing, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 698, 711-12 (1981) (stating that in-person solicitation implicates a
person's privacy interest, but arguing that restrictions on in-person solicitation should not
be too broad). See generally Kabateck, supra note 16, at 926-27 (explaining how in-person
solicitation implicates citizens' privacy interests).
19. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464, 468 (upholding a ban on in-person solicitation by lawyers
because such behavior is "inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of miscon-
duct" when it is conducted for pecuniary gain); Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474-75 (finding that
because "the mode of communication makes all the difference," targeted, direct-mail solic-
itations are not analogous to in-person solicitation and present much less risk of overreach-
ing and undue influence); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (finding that a newspaper
advertisement conveying information about legal services "poses much less risk of over-
reaching or undue influence" than in-person solicitation because an advertisement is
"more conducive to reflection"); cf. Norris v. Alabama State Bar, 582 So. 2d 1034, 1037
(Ala. 1991) (holding that sending flowers, a letter of solicitation, and a firm brochure to a
funeral home constituted improper solicitation); In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1271 (N.J.)
(holding that sending a solicitation letter to a Lockerbie plane crash victim's family the day
after the body was identified violated New Jersey's ban on soliciting legal business when
the attorney knew or should have known that the prospective client could not make a
reasoned judgment regarding the hiring of an attorney), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 956 (1992).
See generally Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Targeted, Direct-Mail Solicitation: Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Association Under Attack, 25 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 22-30 (1993) (arguing that several state
court decisions holding that restrictions on direct-mail solicitations to "vulnerable" victims
are unconstitutional under Shapero's holding that targeted, direct-mail solicitations do not
create risks of undue influence and overreaching); Anthony, supra note 18, at 709-10 (stat-
ing that bans on in-person solicitation have been justified because of inherent risks of
"fraud, deception, coercion, harassment, misrepresentation, and overreaching," but argu-
ing that not all forms of in-person solicitation present these dangers because only a small
percentage of lawyers can be expected to act in bad faith); Kabateck, supra note 16, at 927-
28 (arguing that the dangers of overreaching inherent in targeted direct-mail solicitations
are not eliminated by assuming that a victim can simply ignore or discard an attorney's
letter).
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Under the free speech clause of the First Amendment, the Court has
invalidated most state restrictions on legal advertising.20 The Court has
reasoned that the public's interest in having access to information facili-
tating informed decisions about legal services outweighs the various inter-
ests that states have advanced in support of their advertising
restrictions.21 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 22 presented the Court with
another opportunity to address the validity of a state-imposed restriction
on legal advertising. 23 For the first time in seventeen years, the Court
upheld a state restriction on legal advertising, finding that the state had
justified its regulation by advancing a substantial state interest. 24
At issue in Florida Bar was the validity of a Florida Bar rule prohibit-
ing attorneys from sending targeted, direct-mail solicitations to personal
injury victims or their families for thirty days after an accident or disas-
ter.25 In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a two-year study examining the
20. E.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473-78 (holding that a state may not impose a blanket
ban on the ability of attorneys to solicit legal business by targeting truthful letters at per-
sons known to have specific legal needs); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647 (holding that a state
may not discipline an attorney for soliciting clients through advertisements "containing
truthful and non-deceptive information and advice regarding the legal rights of potential
clients"); R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 204-06 (invalidating restrictions that limited the terminology
lawyers could use in describing practice areas, prohibited attorneys from listing the courts
and states in which they were licensed to practice, and restricted the persons to whom
lawyers could send announcement cards); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384
(1977) (holding that states may not ban truthful advertising of routine legal services); Peel,
496 U.S. at 110 (invalidating a state prohibition on attorneys' ability to list certifications or
specializations). But see Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468 (holding that states may impose blanket
bans on in-person solicitation); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2374 (1995)
(holding that states may "prohibit personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-
mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident or
disaster").
21. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-79, 384 (rejecting as insufficient several advanced state in-
terests, including maintaining standards of licensed professionals and deterring litigation,
and holding that lawyers may advertise prices for certain routine services); see supra note
14 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of consumer access to the free flow
of commercial information); see also Brooks, supra note 12, at 14-15 (stating that the
Court's decisions in R.M.J., Zauderer, and Shapero, "illustrate the Supreme Court's em-
phasis on consumer protection"); Ballantine, supra note 9, at 142-43 (discussing identified
state interests and their treatment by the Court).
22. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
23. Id. at 2374.
24. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 40 and 178-80 (discussing the Court's find-
ing that the Florida Bar had advanced a substantial state interest).
25. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374. Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) of the Florida Bar states that:
"[a] lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent,... a written communi-
cation to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employ-
ment if: (A) the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the per-
son to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless
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public's opinion of attorney advertising.26 The study revealed that the
reputation of the legal profession was suffering because the public per-
ceived direct-mail solicitations to be an invasion of privacy. 2 As a result
the accident or disaster occurred more than thirty days prior to the mailing of the
communication."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulat-
ing the Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 466 (Fla. 1990)).
Similarly, Rule 4-7.8(a) prohibits an attorney from accepting referrals from a referral
service "unless the service: (1) engages in no communication with the public and in no
direct contact with prospective clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct if the communication or contact were made by the lawyer." Id. For a
comprehensive description and analysis the Florida Bar's advertising restrictions and rele-
vant case law since 1941, see Robert D. Peltz, Legal Advertising - Opening Pandora's
Box?, 19 STETSON L. REV. 43, 81-103 (1989).
26. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
27. Id. at 2376. According to the Florida Bar, the two-year study revealed that fifty-
four percent of Florida's population considered contacting personal injury victims to be an
invasion of privacy. Id. at 2377. Similarly, forty-five percent of persons who had received
direct-mail advertising believed that such letters were intended "to take advantage of gulli-
ble or unstable people." Id. Thirty-four percent of those persons receiving solicitation
letters were annoyed at having received them, and twenty-six percent believed that the
letters constituted an invasion of privacy. Id. Finally, twenty-seven percent of those per-
sons having received a direct-mail solicitation indicated that the experience negatively af-
fected their opinion of the legal profession and the judicial process. Id. For a more
comprehensive description of the Florida Bar's survey, see Peltz, supra note 25, at 117-18.
Mr. Peltz reports that of the twenty-seven percent of survey respondents who indicated
that direct-mail solicitations adversely affected their opinion of the legal profession, eleven
percent admitted that they even questioned the competency and honesty of the legal pro-
fession. Id. at 117. Furthermore, these persons reported that this lack of faith in the legal
profession would compromise their ability to serve as unbiased jurors in a civil trial. Id.
Mr. Peltz contends that, because most people are reluctant to admit their inability to serve
as unbiased jurors, the eleven percent figure is probably low. Id. Mr. Peltz also describes a
related survey, conducted by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, which revealed how
television advertisements have negatively affected the public's perception of the profession
and "the ability of attorneys to act as officers of the court." Id. at 114.
The public's negative reaction to direct-mail advertising has been reported widely. See
LaRoe, supra note 13, at 1541-43 & nn.97-100. For a comprehensive analysis of an Iowa
Bar survey regarding the effects of advertising on the public's attitude toward the legal
profession, see Rossi & Weighner, supra note 12, at 232-42. Rossi and Weighner analyze
the "nexus theory" of legal advertising, which links the public's perception of lawyers to
the judicial system. Id. at 223-36. This theory further recognizes a state's competing inter-
est in regulating lawyers, thus ensuring the appearance of a just judicial system. Id. Rossi
and Weighner note that the Iowa Bar survey revealed that the public rated advertising
lawyers lower than lawyers in general in all of the following categories: honesty, compe-
tency, helpfulness, effectiveness, and reliability. Id. at 234-35. This perception of lawyers,
however, was not reflected in the respondents' opinion of the court system, as they re-
ported a higher opinion of lawyers than the courts. Id. at 236-37. Rossi and Weighner,
therefore, conclude that strictly regulating legal advertising is not justified by a state inter-
est in protecting the profession's dignity. Id. at 253.
Recently, the ABA also examined the effects of advertising on the legal profession.
ABA, CROSSROADS, supra note 12. The ABA conducted public hearings around the coun-
try in 1994 and concluded that legal advertising is only one factor with a "minor influence"
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of the study, the Florida Bar amended its rules in 1990 to prohibit lawyers
from sending written communications, for the purpose of soliciting pro-
fessional employment, to personal injury victims or their families for
thirty days after an accident or disaster.2 8
A Florida personal injury attorney29 and his wholly-owned referral ser-
vice challenged the rule, contending that it violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.30 In support of its rule, the Florida Bar argued that
direct-mail solicitation of persons known to need legal services consti-
tutes a "direct interpersonal encounter" that is fraught with the potential
for abuse.3' Rejecting this characterization of direct-mail solicitations,
the district court held that the Florida Bar's interest was insufficient to
support the rule's prophylactic restriction.3 2 The district court also re-
jected the Florida Bar's contention that its rule was a valid time, place,
and manner restriction.33 The court found that, not only was the rule con-
tent-based, but, unlike other forms of disruptive communications, the let-
ters simply could be discarded by the recipient.34 Relying on similar
on the declining public perception of the profession. Id. at 66. The ABA also describes
many other similar studies and surveys that have been conducted over the last 20 years by
various organizations. Id. at 71-88. Regarding the Florida Bar survey, the ABA stated that
"the data suggested a variety of interpretations." Id. at 73. In particular, the ABA noted
that, although the Florida Bar study indicated that direct-mail solicitation affected jury
pools, the study did not inquire about the "extent and nature of that affect [sic]." Id. at 87.
Therefore, "it is unknown whether the affect [sic] would have been a bias against or in
favor of a lawyer, a party or the judicial system. It is also unknown whether the bias would
affect the decision-making even if the court admonished the juror against it." Id.
28. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374. The rules also prohibited lawyers from accepting
clients from referral services that sent written communications to victims within thirty days
of an accident. Id.; see supra note 25 (quoting the rule proscribing referral services).
29. The original petitioner, Mr. McHenry, who was disbarred after commencing this
suit for reasons unrelated to the suit, was replaced by Mr. John T. Blakely. Florida Bar,
115 S. Ct. at 2374.
30. Id.
31. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1545-46 (M.D. Fla. 1992), affd, 21
F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'dsub nom., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 115 S. Ct. 2371
(1995). In addition, the Florida Bar argued that an attorney desiring a retainer faces a
conflict of interest that may affect his initial advice to a "vulnerable" client. Id. at 1546.
32. Id. The district court relied on the Supreme Court's prior holding that "truthful
straightforward direct mail lawyer advertising is constitutionally protected commercial
speech." Id. (citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988)). In Shapero, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that direct-mail solicitation is conducive to abuse,
emphasizing that the "mode of communication" and not the susceptibility of the letter's
recipient was the "relevant inquiry." McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1546 (quoting Shapero, 486
U.S. at 474). The Shapero Court also found that the recipient of a targeted, direct-mail
solicitation has the ability to reflect and to make an informed decision, thereby reducing
the potential for abuse. Id. (citing Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476).
33. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1547.
34. Id. The district court rejected the Florida Bar's attempts to analogize mailed solic-
itations to election signs, sound trucks, and picketing, which are forms of communication
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grounds, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed. 35 Like the district court, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Florida
Bar's contention that its rule protected traumatized personal injury vic-
tims and their families from making an uninformed decision regarding
legal services.36 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Florida
Bar's newly-asserted state interest that its rule was necessary to protect
the privacy of personal injury victims. 37
subject to valid time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. The court stated that those com-
munications could not be avoided "simply by averting [one's] eyes." Id. (quoting Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 n.25 (1978)). The two complementary purposes
of valid time, place, and manner restrictions are "facilitating the exercise of the freedom of
expression, while accommodating conflicting societal interests unrelated to first amend-
ment values." Langworthy, supra note 3, at 130. Time, place, and manner restrictions
"must be content-neutral, narrowly drawn, serve a significant governmental interest, and
leave open alternative channels of communication." Id.; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also James A. Kushner, Freedom to Hear. The
First Amendment, Commercial Speech and Access to Information, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 137,
146 n.47 (1981) (stating that time, place, and manner restrictions are content-neutral, but
that they "constrict the flow of information and ideas as a secondary effect of governmen-
tal pursuit of other objectives"). See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NO-
WAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.47 (2nd ed.
1992).
35. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038,1045 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom., Flor-
ida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
36. Id. at 1042-43. The court rejected the Florida Bar's attempts to distinguish Sha-
pero, in which the Court held that a State could not ban potentially abusive targeted direct-
mail solicitations because a potential client may feel overwhelmed by his legal troubles
and, thus, be especially vulnerable to such communications. Id.; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474-
75. In Shapero, an attorney sought permission to send targeted, direct-mail solicitations to
persons facing foreclosure on their homes. 486 U.S. at 469. The Court reversed the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court's finding that attorneys could be categorically prohibited from send-
ing solicitations to persons known to have specific legal needs. Id. at 473-80.
In McHenry, the Florida Bar attempted to distinguish Shapero based on the susceptibil-
ity of the person targeted with the solicitation, arguing that its 30 day restriction was justi-
fied because personal injury victims were more vulnerable than potential clients merely
facing foreclosure. 21 F.3d at 1043. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this distinction, reason-
ing that Shapero emphasized the "mode of communications," not the sensitivity of the
letter's recipient. Id. Therefore, the Florida Bar's contention that the "heightened sensi-
tivity" of the personal injury victims who receive mailed solicitations did not satisfactorily
justify the rule. Id.
37. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1043-44. In rejecting this argument, the Eleventh Circuit
again relied on Shapero where the Supreme Court found that "a targeted letter [does not]
invade the recipient's privacy any more than does a substantively identical letter mailed at
large." Id. at 1044 (quoting Shapero. 486 U.S. at 476). The Eleventh Circuit also noted
that even though almost all direct-mail advertising "invades" the tranquility of the home, it
nonetheless is protected by the First Amendment. Id.
In an unusual postscript to its decision, however, the Eleventh Circuit alluded to Justice
Powell's dissent in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, noting that he had predicted correctly that
attorney advertising would profoundly affect the legal profession. Id. at 1045 (citing Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 389 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)); see infra note 100 (discussing Justice Powell's dissent in Bates). Finding the Flor-
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari38 and reversed.39 Writing for
the majority, Justice O'Connor determined that the Florida Bar's inter-
ests in protecting the privacy of personal injury victims and restricting
activities that negatively affect the administration of justice were substan-
tial interests justifying the state bar rule.4" The Court also held that the
Florida Bar had demonstrated that the rule was narrowly tailored4 and
that it directly and materially advanced these governmental interests.42
In dissent, Justice Kennedy contended that the Florida Bar had failed to
articulate a substantial state interest.43 Moreover, even if the State's as-
serted interests were substantial, the rule did not advance those interests
and was not narrowly tailored. 4
ida Bar's attempts to curb intrusive attorney behavior "understandable," the court stated
that Bates and its progeny, nonetheless, required the court to invalidate the challenged
rule. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1045.
38. Florida Bar v. McHenry, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994).
39. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995).
40. Id. at 2376. Justice O'Connor explained that the interest of protecting victims'
privacy "factors" into the state's "paramount" interest of restricting activities that have a
negative impact on the "administration of justice." Id. As demonstrated by the Florida
Bar's study, Florida's citizenry believes that direct-mail solicitations constitute an invasion
of one's privacy and that such conduct has contributed to lawyers' "flagging reputations."
Id. Curbing such conduct, therefore, would improve the perception of the legal profession
and preserve its integrity. Id.; see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's finding that the Florida Bar had demonstrated that its rule directly advanced a
substantial state interest). But see Rossi & Weighner, supra note 12, at 232-42 (questioning
the validity of the "nexus theory" which underlies Justice O'Connor's argument).
41. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380-81. The Court stated that the Florida Bar rule
imposed only a thirty-day ban and that information regarding the availability of legal serv-
ices was available through other means. Id.
42. Id. at 2377-79. The Court found that the Florida Bar's two-year study demon-
strated that direct-mail solicitations adversely affected the public's perception of the legal
profession and that curtailing such activity would help reverse this trend. Id. at 2377-80;
see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (describing the Court's finding that the Flor-
ida Bar had satisfied the second prong of the Central Hudson test by demonstrating that
the rule directly and materially advanced a substantial state interest).
43. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that (1) protecting victims' privacy is not a substantial state interest in the context of
restricting direct-mail solicitations, and (2) direct-mail solicitations actually may promote
the administration of justice. Id.; see infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text (describing
Justice Kennedy's contention that the Florida Bar had failed to articulate a substantial
state interest in support of its rule).
44. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383-84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that the Florida Bar's study of legal advertising's effect on lawyers' reputations did
not demonstrate that the rule directly and materially advanced the state's asserted inter-
ests. Id. Justice Kennedy also argued that the Florida Bar rule was not narrowly tailored
because it suppressed more speech than necessary to achieve the state's asserted interests.
Id. at 2384-86; see infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy's
argument that the Florida Bar had failed to satisfy the second and third prongs of the
Central Hudson test).
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This Note first outlines the Supreme Court's decisions granting First
Amendment protection to commercial speech and legal advertising. This
Note then examines the Court's decisions addressing the constitutionality
of state-imposed restrictions on legal advertising and discusses the types
of advertising that have been found to be permissible, as well as the
Court's assessment of the various interests that states have advanced to
justify restrictions on legal advertising. This Note then examines the
Court's decision in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. and analyzes the state
interests that the Court found to be sufficiently substantial to justify the
Florida Bar's restriction. This Note argues that in Florida Bar, the Court
ignored established consumer interests in commercial speech and ele-
vated certain other state interests in order to find the Florida Bar's as-
serted interests to be substantial. Finally, this Note argues that the
Court's decision in Florida Bar is fundamentally flawed because it is pre-
mised on a public opinion survey, which is an inherently shifting standard
and prone to varying interpretations. As a result, states will be able to
support more restrictive rules governing legal advertising by merely com-
missioning their own public opinion surveys demonstrating that citizens
dislike a particular practice.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT TO LEGAL ADVERTISING
A. The First Amendment and Commercial Speech
Until 1976, commercial speech was not entitled to First Amendment
protection.45 In extending constitutional protection to commercial
speech, including legal advertising, the Court emphasized that the free
flow of commercial information is critical to consumers' ability to make
informed decisions about products and services.4 6 The Court explained,
however, that because "commonsense differences" existed between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech, commercial speech was not entitled
to complete First Amendment protection. 47 Instead, the Court devel-
oped an analytical standard for determining whether an asserted state in-
terest justifies a restriction on commercial speech.48
45. See infra text accompanying notes 49-67 (discussing the development of the
Court's treatment of commercial speech).
46. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (stating that the free flow of commercial information was "indispensa-
ble" to the consumer's ability to make well-informed and intelligent decisions).
47. Id. at 771 n.24.
48. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (announcing a three-prong test for analyzing restrictions on commercial speech); see
infra text accompanying notes 68-80 (discussing Central Hudson's three-prong test).
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1. Extending First Amendment Protection to Commercial Speech
In 1942, the Supreme Court held in Valentine v. Chrestensen49 that the
First Amendment did not protect commercial speech. 0 Upholding a
New York City ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial ad-
vertising, the Court ruled, without explanation and without citing prece-
dent, that the First Amendment did not protect "purely commercial
advertising."5" Over the next thirty years, however, the Court's ruling in
Chrestensen was criticized increasingly,52 and by the mid-1970s the Court
had almost completely retreated from it.53
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc. 51 marked a full retreat from Valentine, as the Court explicitly held
that the First Amendment protects commercial speech. 5 Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy involved a challenge to a Virginia statute that prohib-
49. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
50. Id. at 54 (holding that the Constitution does not protect "purely commercial
advertising").
51. Id. The Court explained that, while states may not unduly burden citizens' free-
doms to communicate information and to disseminate opinions in the streets, governments
were not restricted when the speech involved "purely commercial advertising." Id. For a
complete description of the factual circumstances surrounding Chrestensen, see R.H.
Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-21 (1977). See also supra
notes 4-5 and accompanying text (describing Chrestensen and the Court's subsequent re-
treat from its holding that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech).
52. For instance, Justice Douglas criticized the Chrestensen ruling as "casual, almost
offhand," and remarked that it "has not survived reflection." Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (characterizing Chresten-
sen's holding as ill-conceived); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975) (character-
izing Chrestensen's holding as limited and stating that Chrestensen did not mean that all
regulation of commercial advertising was "immune from constitutional challenge"). See
generally Coase, supra note 51, at 21-22 (elaborating on Douglas's dissent in Cammarano);
Rotunda, supra note 6, at 1090-93 (criticizing the Supreme Court's approach to commercial
speech as "confusing and ambiguous"); Elaine Bayus, Note, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Expression, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761, 778 (describing Justice Douglas's
dissent in Dun & Bradstreet).
53. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 758-61 (1976) (outlining the Court's First Amendment treatment of commer-
cial speech and stating that, since 1951, the Court had not denied First Amendment protec-
tion to any speech merely because it was commercial). For a more detailed analysis of the
Court's treatment of commercial speech see McGowan, supra note 2, at 361-81. See also
Farber, supra note 5, at 376-79 (describing the Court's unwillingness to rely on Chrestensen
in subsequent commercial speech cases); Roberts, supra note 4, at 116-26 (describing the
Court's treatment of commercial speech after Chrestensen and its reluctance to rely on the
Chrestensen holding).
54. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
55. Id. at 770.
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ited pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices.56 Invalidating
the statute, the Court first explained that the First Amendment protected
both a speaker's right to communicate and the recipient's right to receive
the communication.57 The Court then weighed the individual and socie-
tal interests in maintaining the availability of the free flow of commercial
information 58 against the state's interest in maintaining the professional
standards of pharmacists.5 9 The Court decided in favor of preserving ac-
56. Id. at 749-50. Pharmacists violating the statute could be found guilty of unprofes-
sional conduct. Id. Prescription drug users challenged the Virginia statute, and argued
that under the First Amendment, they were entitled to receive price information from
pharmacists who wished to advertise such information to the public. Id. at 753-54; see
supra note 6 (discussing commentary pertaining to the Court's decision in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy).
57. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57. In finding that the First
Amendment protects the right to receive information, the Court rejected Justice Rehn-
quist's contention in his dissent that the right to receive information from someone seeking
to disseminate it does not exist when the information is available elsewhere. Id. at 757
n.15. But cf. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2380-81 (1995) (upholding a
30-day ban on direct-mail advertising by personal injury lawyers, in part because the in-
tended recipient could obtain information about available legal services through other
media).
58. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-66. The Court stated that having
commercial information available was indispensable to a consumer's ability to make intelli-
gent and well-informed decisions. Id. at 765. Society also had a "strong interest" in adver-
tising because, even if "tasteless and excessive," advertising was "nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price." Id. at 764-65. The Court stated that an individual consumer
who needed price information about necessary drugs had an interest in the free flow of
commercial information that "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
In addition, the Court stated that commercial information was necessary to promote the
"proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system." Id. at 765. As long as the
United States maintains a "free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions." Id. More-
over, the Court stated that the free flow of commercial information was indispensable to
forming opinions about how the free enterprise should be regulated or changed. Id. The
Court concluded that "[tiherefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be pri-
marily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say
that the free flow of information does not serve that goal." Id. (footnotes omitted); see
supra note 14 (describing the Court's decisions acknowledging consumers' right in the free
flow of commercial information).
59. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766. The Court acknowledged the
State's substantial interest in preserving pharmacists' high level of professionalism, but
found that this interest should not be protected by maintaining public ignorance about
drug prices. Id. at 769. The Court stated that an alternative to the State's "highly paternal-
istic approach" would have been to assume that price information was not harmful, and
that "people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,
and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them." Id. at 770. Moreover, the Court added that the State could achieve its
objective of maintaining professional standards through close regulation of pharmacists.
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cess to commercial information 60 and held that a state may not suppress
information regarding prescription drug prices.61
The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court emphasized, however,
that its ruling was limited to commercial advertising by pharmacists who
dispensed standardized products.62 The Court specifically reserved the
issue of whether the legal and medical professions could advertise, 63 ex-
plaining that, because lawyers and doctors dispense an unlimited variety
of professional services, advertising in these professions presented a
higher risk of deception.64 Therefore, different factors were to be consid-
ered in determining whether these professions could advertise.65
Finally, the Court noted in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy that com-
mercial speech is entitled to only limited First Amendment protection.66
The Court stated that because "commonsense differences" exist between
commercial speech and other varieties of speech, commercial speech
should be accorded a "different degree of protection. '67 The Court did
Id. at 768. The Court noted that the State could maintain professional standards through
subsidization or by protecting pharmacists from competition. Id. at 770.
60. Id. at 770.
61. Id. at 773. In other words, the state may not "completely suppress the dissemina-
tion of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity." Id.
62. Id. at 773 n.25.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Court explained that the legal and medical professions provide "profes-
sional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibil-
ity for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising." Id.
The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court did not elaborate on the kind of advertising
that posed a greater risk of confusion and deception in the legal and medical professions.
See id. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, however, the Court indicated that, in some cases,
advertising claims regarding the quality of legal services could be misleading or deceptive
to the public. 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977). In addition, the Bates Court noted that in-person
solicitation, which "breeds undue influence," could pose special dangers of overreaching or
misrepresentation. Id.
65. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. The Court did not explain
those "different factors." See id.
66. For example, as the Court explained, commercial speech remains subject to time,
place, and manner restrictions. Id. at 771; see supra note 34 (describing time, place, and
manner restrictions). In addition, states may freely regulate untruthful, deceptive or mis-
leading commercial speech. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; see supra note
15 (discussing federal and state court decisions on misleading or deceptive advertising).
67. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. For example, because an
advertiser disseminates information about a specific product or service for which he has
more information, the veracity of commercial speech is more objective and verifiable than
news reporting or political commentary. Id. In addition, because commercial speech is
motivated by profit, it is more durable and less likely to be "chilled by proper regulation"
than other forms of speech. Id. The Court explained that these characteristics of commer-
cial speech render inaccuracies less tolerable. Id. These characteristics also "make it ap-
propriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such
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not, however, elaborate on the level of protection that commercial speech
should receive.
2. Establishing a Standard for Evaluating State Limits on
Commercial Speech
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,68 the Court articulated a standard for evaluating state restrictions
on commercial speech.69 Central Hudson involved a utility company's
challenge to a New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC) regulation
prohibiting electric utilities from advertising to promote the use of elec-
tricity.7" Central Hudson contended that the NYPSC's regulation consti-
tuted a commercial speech restriction that violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.71 The State argued that the advertising ban
would facilitate energy conservation and help minimize utility costs.7"
The Court formulated a three-pronged analysis to evaluate the
NYPSC's regulation.73 The Court stated that states may freely regulate
additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being
deceptive." Id.
68. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
69. Id. at 563-66.
70. Id. at 558-59. The NYPSC based the regulation on its finding that New York's
electric utility system lacked sufficient fuel to meet consumer demand during the winter of
1973-74. Id. The NYPSC extended the prohibition in 1977, despite arguments by Central
Hudson that it violated the First Amendment. Id. at 559.
The NYPSC categorized utility advertising as either promotional or informational. Id.
The NYPSC permitted informational advertising that was intended to encourage consum-
ers to shift their electricity consumption to "off-peak" periods when demand is lower. Id.
The NYPSC reasoned that informational advertising did not promote an increase in total
demand, but facilitated a more consistent level of electricity use throughout the day. Id. at
560.
71. Id. The NYPSC's rule was upheld at the trial, appellate, and state supreme court
levels. Id. at 560-61. The New York Court of Appeals questioned whether the advertising
at issue was protected commercial speech because Central Hudson held a monopoly on
providing electricity. Id. at 566-67. The appellate court stated that, because consumers
had no alternative source of electricity, Central Hudson's advertising contained little useful
information that could promote more informed decisionmaking. Id. Rejecting this reason-
ing, the United States Supreme Court argued that electricity faces competition from other
fuel sources such as fuel oil and natural gas. Id. at 567. Noting that monopoly providers
are not likely to pay for advertising that has no value to its customers, the Court stated that
even in monopoly markets, suppressing advertising reduces the availability of information
to consumers and violates the purpose of the First Amendment. Id.
72. Id. at 568-69.
73. Id. at 564-66. The Central Hudson Court characterized its new test as having four
prongs, the first prong being an inquiry into whether the speech at issue is misleading. Id.
at 566. The Court in Florida Bar, however, characterizes the Central Hudson test as three-
pronged. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. Although the Florida Bar Court began its analy-
sis with whether the commercial, speech is misleading, the Court did not include this in-
quiry as a formal element of the Central Hudson test. See id. To maintain consistency with
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commercial speech that is misleading or involves illegal activity; other-
wise, the government's ability to regulate commercial speech is limited.74
The Court held that to justify a restriction on commercial speech a state
must (1) advance a substantial interest to be accomplished by the restric-
tion;75 (2) demonstrate that the regulation advances that articulated state
interest;76 and (3) demonstrate that the restriction is narrowly drawn.77
the Florida Bar, Court's analysis, this Note adopts its characterization of the Central Hud-
son test as having three prongs.
74. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. The Court explained that because the First
Amendment is concerned with the informational value of commercial speech, a state's
suppression of deceptive commercial information about a lawful activity does not pose a
constitutional problem. Id. at 563 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 783 (1978)). Furthermore, a state's suppression of commercial speech concerning ille-
gal activity does not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 563-64 (citing Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973)). Similarly, in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Court upheld a state-imposed disclosure
requirement, finding that the advertised statement, "if there is no recovery, no legal fees
are owed by our clients" was misleading because it did not indicate that clients would still
be liable for costs, even if they lost their lawsuit. 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985). The Court thus
upheld the state's requirement that lawyers' advertisements disclose a client's potential
financial liability. Id. at 652-53; see also Richard M. Schmidt, Jr. & Robert C. Burns, Proof
or Consequences: False Advertising and the Doctrine of Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1273, 1282-84 (1988) (observing that in Zauderer, the Court acknowledged that state
restrictions on misleading speech must not be unduly burdensome and that the state may
be required to demonstrate consumer deception if the misleading nature of such speech is
not "self-evident"); Nan K. McKenzie, Ambiguity, Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1295, 1300-04 (1988) (explaining that the Court's refusal
to protect false or misleading commercial speech is premised on the fact that such speech is
detrimental to a free market economic system).
75. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65. In Edenfield v. Fane, the Court stated that,
unlike a rational basis review, under Central Hudson the Court may not "supplant the
precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions." 507 U.S. 761, 768
(1993) (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)); see supra note 9 (describ-
ing various state interests that the Court has found to be substantial).
76. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. The government bears the burden of demon-
strating that the restriction advances the asserted state interest. Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1592 (1995). "[M]ere speculation or conjecture" is insufficient to
satisfy this burden. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770. The state "must demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree." Id.
77. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65. In Fox, the Court held that "narrowly tai-
lored" does not require a state to employ the least restrictive means of regulating commer-
cial speech. 492 U.S. at 479-80. Rather, a state must demonstrate only that a reasonable fit
exists between its objective and the means used to achieve that goal. Id.; Posadas de Pu-
erto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (stating that the Court requires
a reasonable fit "between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends"); see Langvardt, supra note 7, at 374-76 (contending that the Court has weakened
the Central Hudson test by requiring only a reasonable fit between the state's ends and
means); Smolla, supra note 2, at 791 n.57 (stating that in Fox, the Court explained that the
legislature's ends must reasonably fit its means and that the fit need not be perfect);
Mauro, supra note 8, at 1951-54 (arguing that the Court's decisions in Posadas and Fox
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Applying this three-pronged analysis, the Central Hudson Court con-
cluded that the State's interests in conserving energy and minimizing con-
sumer costs were substantial.78 The Court further found that the
NYPSC's regulation advanced the State's interest in promoting energy
conservation.79 Nonetheless, the Court invalidated the regulation be-
cause it was too broad to satisfy the third prong of the analysis.8"
B. Extending First Amendment Protection to Legal Advertising
In its decisions addressing the constitutionality of state restrictions on
legal advertising or solicitation, the Supreme Court has refused to permit
states to prohibit advertising or solicitation that is not misleading, poten-
tially misleading, false, or deceptive, 8' especially when the activity is sub-
ject to effective oversight by either the state or the legal profession.82
have reduced Central Hudson's level of scrutiny from intermediate to a rational basis test);
McGowan, supra note 2, at 380 (explaining that the Court requires a statute merely to
loosely fit its stated objectives).
78. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69. The Court noted that, given the nation's de-
pendence on energy sources that are beyond its control, "no one can doubt the importance
of energy conservation." Id. at 568. Moreover, the Court agreed that maintaining fair and
equitable consumer rates also was a "clear and substantial" state interest. Id. at 569.
79. Sd. at 569. The Court, however, found that the regulation did not advance the
State's second goal of minimizing consumers' energy costs. Id. The Court found that the
link between a prohibition on promotional advertising and the reasonableness of con-
sumer's rates was "tenuous" and "highly speculative." Id.
80. Id. at 570. Finding that the regulation was not narrowly drawn, the Court stated
that the regulation prohibited advertising that would reduce or have no effect on total
energy consumption, such as the promotion of more efficient energy services. Id. For
instance, the NYPSC's regulation prohibited electric utilities from advertising the use of a
heat pump, which even the State acknowledged promotes energy efficiency. Id. Further-
more, the regulation prohibited utilities from advertising electric heat as an alternative to
other sources of heat, such as solar heat. Id. The Court also found that the State failed to
demonstrate that it could not achieve its objectives by less restrictive methods. Id. at 570-
71. The Court noted that the NYPSC could instead fashion rules that limit the format and
content of Central Hudson's advertising. Id. at 571 & n.13.
81. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 480 (1988) (reversing a
Kentucky Supreme Court decision prohibiting an attorney from sending targeted, direct-
mail solicitation to potential clients known to face particular legal problems); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985) (holding that an "attorney may not
be disciplined for soliciting legal business through printed advertising containing truthful
and non-deceptive information and advice regarding the legal rights of potential clients");
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (holding that states may not categorically ban adver-
tising that is potentially misleading); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)
(holding that states may not ban truthful advertising of routine legal services); see also
infra notes 87-124 and accompanying text (describing the Court's decisions in Bates and
R.M.J. ).
82. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 477-78 (finding that the record failed to demonstrate
that targeted solicitations are more burdensome than printed advertisements to monitor
and outlining various methods of scrutinizing direct-mail solicitations); Zauderer, 471 U.S.
at 644-47 (imposing on the state the burden of distinguishing false or deceptive advertise-
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The Court has upheld state prohibitions when advertising or solicitation
presents unacceptable risks of overreaching, 83 or the invasion of pri-
vacy,84 and when the form of advertising is not conducive to effective
ments containing legal advice from those advertisements that are truthful); R.M.J., 455
U.S. at 206 (invalidating a state restriction that determined the persons to whom an attor-
ney could send professional announcement cards because the State failed to demonstrate
that it was unable to supervise such mailings by requiring them to be filed with a state
reviewing agency); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
109-10 (1990) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a state prohibition on an attorney's ability to
advertise a certification or specialty and finding that the State had failed to demonstrate
that its regulatory agencies could not effectively police deceptive advertisements and dis-
tinguish legitimate from illegitimate certifying boards); cf Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 466-67 (1978) (upholding a prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation in part
because the activity occurs in private and is not subject to oversight by either the state or
the legal profession). See generally Rossi & Weighner, supra note 12, at 207 (describing
the Iowa Bar's requirement that a lawyer who seeks to send targeted direct-mail solicita-
tions first submit the materials to the Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of
the Iowa Bar Association and obtain a finding that the proposed solicitation is not "'false,
deceptive, or misleading."'); Ballantine, supra note 9, at 145-51 (discussing various meth-
ods of monitoring attorney direct-mail solicitations); Paul C. Drecksel, Note, Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Association and Targeted, Direct-Mail Solicitation by Lawyers: How Can
States Protect Their Residents from Overreaching and Deceptive Solicitation?, 1989 UTAH
L. REV. 521, 538-41 (1989) (proposing oversight measures for targeted, direct-mail solicita-
tions); Kabateck, supra note 16, at 942-48 (urging state bar associations to regulate direct-
mail solicitations by (1) implementing pre-approval procedures; (2) imposing mandatory
disclosure requirements for all such communications; (3) requiring that direct-mail solicita-
tions be sent only to verifiable addresses; and (4) imposing a "holding period" on the mail-
ing of solicitations to personal injury or wrongful death victims).
83. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474-75 (finding that, because the "mode of communication
makes all the difference," targeted, direct-mail solicitations are not analogous to in-person
solicitation and present much less risk of overreaching and undue influence); Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 464-65 (finding a greater potential for overreaching when "a lawyer, a professional
trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed
lay person"); see also Daniel T. Graham, Comment, Professional Responsibility-An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association: Is There Any Possibility of Over-
reaching in a Targeted, Direct Mail Solicitation?, 1989 J. CORP. L. 809, 825-27 (stating that,
given the Court's decision in Shapero, states will have difficulty incorporating overreaching
provisions into their rules governing direct-mail solicitations).
84. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1995) (upholding a state ban
on sending targeted, direct-mail solicitations to personal injury victims within thirty days of
an accident, in part, because the public perceives such solicitation to be an invasion of
privacy); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465-66 & n.25 (finding that in-person solicitation for pecuni-
ary gain invades a potential client's privacy because the target of the solicitation cannot
avoid the attorney's advances); see supra note 18 and infra notes 187-98 and accompanying
text (examining the Florida Bar Court's finding that targeted, direct-mail solicitation con-
stitutes an invasion of privacy). Contra Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476 (finding that, unlike in-
person solicitation, targeted direct-mail solicitation does not invade the recipient's pri-
vacy). See generally Anthony, supra note 18, at 709-28 (stating that privacy interests are
implicated by in-person solicitation); Kabateck, supra note 16, at 926-27 (arguing that
targeted, direct-mail solicitations invade the recipient's privacy).
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oversight.8 5 The Court has grounded its holdings on the fundamental
principle that access to the free flow of commercial information enables
consumers to make informed and reasoned decisions about legal
services.86
1. States May Not Categorically Ban Advertising That is Not
Misleading, Potentially Misleading, or Deceptive
One year after the Court decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
the Court held that the First Amendment also protects legal advertising. 7
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,8 8 two lawyers ran a telephone directory
advertisement in which they advertised that their legal clinic provided
"routine" legal services at "very reasonable fees."' 89 Conceding that their
advertisement violated one of the disciplinary rules of the Supreme Court
of Arizona,9" the lawyers challenged the rule, contending that it violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 9 The Court agreed and invali-
dated it.92 In Bates, as in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court
emphasized the importance of consumers' interest in the free flow of
commercial information, and concluded that the disciplinary rule perpet-
uated public ignorance about the nature and costs of available products
and services. 93
85. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466-67 (upholding a ban on in-person solicitation by lawyers,
in part, because such activity occurs in private and can not be regulated or monitored). See
supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holdings that states may not
prohibit non-misleading advertising that can be effectively supervised).
86. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's emphasis on the
importance of consumer access to the free flow of commercial information).
87. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that states may not
categorically ban lawyers from publishing truthful advertisements regarding "the availabil-
ity and terms of routine legal services"); see The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 188, 205-08 (analyzing the Court's decision in Bates).
88. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
89. Id. at 354. The routine services that the lawyers provided included uncontested
divorces and adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and name changes. Id.
90. Id. at 355. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) stated, in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the
city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Id.
91. Id. at 356. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the appellants' constitutional
claims. Id.; In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
92. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
93. Id. at 364-65; see supra notes 57-59 (discussing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy's
emphasis on the importance of commercial information to individuals and to society).
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The Court rejected several justifications that the State advanced in sup-
port of its restriction.94 As in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the
Court rejected the State's claim that permitting lawyers to advertise their
prices would adversely affect professionalism.95 The Court explained that
the general public understands that lawyers earn their livelihoods practic-
ing law, and that no client expects to receive free legal services. 96 More-
over, other professions, such as bankers and engineers, advertise without
being considered undignified.97 Finally, the Court suggested that the fail-
ure to advertise actually may contribute to the public's disillusionment
with the legal profession because information concerning the price and
availability of legal services was unavailable. 98
The Court also rejected the State's arguments that, because legal serv-
ices are highly individualized and are not conducive to standardization,
attorney advertising would be misleading.99 The Court stressed that only
"routine" services could be advertised at standardized rates and that the
State retains authority to specify which services must be contained in an
advertized package.1"' Moreover, the Court stated that an advertise-
94. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-79.
95. Id. at 368-72. Specifically, the State argued that allowing lawyers to advertise their
prices would promote commercialism. Id. at 368. Such commercialism would "undermine
the attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth" and threaten the lawyer's obligation to self-
lessly serve the public. Id. Similarly, the State argued that advertising would cause clients
to doubt that their attorneys are pursuing the clients' best interests. Id. Finally, the State
argued that price advertising would threaten the profession's dignified public image. Id.
96. Id. at 368-69.
97. Id. at 369-70.
98. Id. at 370-71.
99. Id. at 372. The State argued that advertising legal services would be misleading
because (1) services are based on individualized circumstances and are not conducive to
"informed comparison" based on an advertisement, (2) consumers do not know in advance
what services they require, and (3) advertisements will not emphasize skill, but rather irrel-
evant factors. Id.
100. ld. at 372-73 & n.28. The Court stated that a client is not required to understand
the details of the legal services that he needs before he seeks legal assistance. Id. at 373
n.28. The Court explained that if the complexity of a potential client's problems is beyond
"routine," that fact usually will become apparent during an initial consultation. Id.
Justice Powell, in his partial dissent, however, agreed with the State that advertising pro-
fessional legal services would be misleading. Id. at 391. He argued that, unlike tangible
products, professional services defy attempts to be characterized as routine because they
involve highly individualized circumstances. Id. at 391-93. He criticized the Court's at-
tempts to divide legal services into categories labelled either unique or routine. Id. For
example, Justice Powell argued, even the simplest divorce can implicate other more com-
plicated legal problems, including child support, alimony, child custody, and tax issues. Id.
at 392-93.
Finally, Justice Powell argued that the Court grossly had overestimated the states' ability
to effectively police the truthfulness of legal advertising. Id. at 396-97. Not only does the
sheer number of practicing attorneys in the country present difficult oversight problems,
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ment's failure to provide all information relevant to selecting an attorney
does not mean that it is misleading.1"1 Echoing Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, the Court rejected the State's attempt to facilitate public igno-
rance regarding the availability of legal services and argued that incom-
plete information about services is better than none. 02
Similarly, the Court rejected the State's contentions that advertising
would adversely affect the administration of justice by encouraging litiga-
tion and by promoting fraudulent claims.' 013 The Court stated that the
need to remove obstacles to the public's ability to seek redress for legal
wrongs outweighs the risk that advertising will promote litigation.0 4
Likewise, the Court rejected the argument that a causal connection exists
between advertising and the filing of fraudulent claims.10 5 Finally, the
Court rejected the State's argument that a wholesale ban on advertising is
necessary because enforcing less comprehensive restrictions is too bur-
densome.'0 6 Rather, the Court stated, the legal profession has a vested
but the nature of legal services simply does not permit an adequate evaluation of the
claims that are made in legal advertisements. Id.
101. Id. at 374; see infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (elaborating on what con-
stitutes misleading advertising).
102. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976)).
103. Bates, 433 U.S. at 375-77 & n.31.
104. Id. at 375-77. Rather, the Court argued that "allowing restrained advertising
would be in accord with the bar's obligation to 'facilitate the process of intelligent selection
of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available."' Id. at 377 (quoting ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1 (1976)).
105. Id. at 375 n.31. The Court stated that those who are prone to abuse the legal
system will do so regardless of whether lawyers advertise. Id.
The Court also rejected the State's contentions that advertising will (1) cause attorney's
costs and prices to increase and (2) adversely affect the quality of service. Id. at 377-78.
First, the Court stated that advertising costs will not necessarily be passed on to consumers.
Id. at 377. Rather, the Court noted, in retail markets, price advertising tends to force
consumer prices downward. Id. Second, the Court rejected the argument that advertising
costs would create an entry barrier to new attorneys seeking access to the market. Id. at
378. Rather, advertising will enable new attorneys to penetrate the market more effec-
tively because they will not be forced to rely on community contacts to generate business.
Id. Finally, regarding quality of service, the Court rejected the State's argument that an
attorney who advertises a set package of services at a given price would be inclined to
ignore additional client needs that might become apparent. Id. The Court emphasized
that an attorney who is prone to providing shoddy work will do so regardless of whether he
advertises. Id. at 378-79.
106. Id. at 379; see In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982) (holding that a State's restric-
tion on the persons to whom an attorney could send professional announcements cards was
invalid because the State failed to demonstrate that it lacked the ability to supervise the
content of such mailings); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's holdings invalidating state restrictions when state oversight could effectively regu-
late potentially misleading or abusive advertising).
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interest in policing its members and can be relied upon to expose those
who violate the honor of the profession. °7
The Bates Court ruled that the First Amendment permits lawyers to
advertise the prices at which they perform certain routine services. 108
The Court stressed the limits of its holding, stating that it did not address
advertising touting the quality of service, which may be conducive to mis-
leading claims. 109 Nor did the Court's decision address in-person solicita-
tion, which may be subject to restrictions because it presents
opportunities for overreaching and misrepresentation that are not pres-
ent in printed advertisements. 1 0 Moreover, the Court stressed that states
107. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379. The Court expressed confidence that most lawyers will
continue to "uphold the integrity and honor of their profession" by advertising in a non-
deceptive and straightforward manner. Id.
108. Id. at 384; see also R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 (stating that "[t]ruthful advertising re-
lated to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment"); Peel v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 109 (1990) (plurality opin-
ion) (holding that a state may not impose a "categorical prohibition against the dissemina-
tion of accurate factual information to the public"). The Bates Court defined "routine"
legal services as "the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, the uncontested personal
bankruptcy, the change of name, and the like." Bates, 433 U.S. at 372; see also supra note
15 and accompanying text (noting that states may not ban commercial speech that is not
misleading or deceptive).
109. Bates, 433 U.S. at 366. Such claims, the Court stated, are more likely to mislead or
deceive the public. Id. at 366, 383-84; see also Spencer v. Honorable Justices of Supreme
Court, 579 F. Supp. 880, 887-88 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that a state may ban the use of
such subjective adjectives as '"experienced,' 'expert,' 'highly qualified' or 'competent"' be-
cause they are difficult to verify), affd, 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985). But see Peel, 496 U.S.
at 102 (permitting a reasonable inference of a "greater degree of professional qualifica-
tion" from an attorney's claim that he has been certified in a particular specialty); see also
Thier, supra note 15, at 695 (arguing that the Peel Court appears to be condoning infer-
ences about the quality of an attorney's legal services). See generally Moss, supra note 15,
at 613-16, 621-31 (discussing how the ABA and various states treat attorney statements
regarding reputation, quality of service, and claims of expertise or specialization); LaRoe,
supra note 13, at 1551 & n.121 (suggesting that an attorney who represents a particular
expertise or specialization should be required to disclose his standing with the certifying
board). For a comprehensive pre-Peel survey of how various state bar associations treat
self-laudatory claims and how such claims have been treated by the courts, see Scott
Makar, Note, Advertising Legal Services: The Case for Quality and Self-Laudatory Claims,
37 U. FLA. L. REV. 969 (1985). Mr. Makar contends that state bar associations should
permit attorneys to make quality and self-laudatory claims in their advertisements. Id. at
971-72. He argues that the definition of a quality or self-laudatory claim lacks uniformity
among state jurisdictions and the result is that many truthful and non-deceptive claims are
being suppressed. Id. at 972-73. Finally, Mr. Makar argues that eliminating prohibitions
on self-laudatory and quality claims will encourage lawyers to use persuasion in their ad-
vertisements and improve the flow of information to the public. Id. at 973-74.
110. Bates, 433 U.S. at 366, 383-84; see infra notes 158-67 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Court's decision in Ohralik).
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were free to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions' l l on
advertising and to prohibit advertising of illegal transactions. 1 2
Having established in Bates that states may not prophylactically ban
non-misleading legal advertising, 1 3 the Court extended this ruling in In
re R.M.J. 4 by holding that states may not prophylactically ban even po-
111. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. For an explanation of time, place, and manner restrictions,
see supra note 34.
The Court also suggested that, to protect against misleading the public, states could re-
quire advertisements to include disclaimers or warnings. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; see also
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652-53 (1985) (sustaining a state
rule requiring attorneys to disclose that, although representation was based upon a contin-
gent-fee billing system, the client would still be liable for costs if he lost the suit). In
Zauderer, the Court also held that the state's disclosure requirements need only be reason-
ably related to the state's interest in preventing consumer deception. Id. at 651; see infra
note 145 (discussing the Zauderer Court's holding that the state's disclosure requirement
regarding contingent-fee representation must merely be reasonable, not the least
restrictive).
112. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Re-
lations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (denying First Amendment protection to an advertisement
because the underlying transaction was illegal).
113. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; see supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
114. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). In re R.M.J. involved a constitutional challenge to a Missouri
Supreme Court rule that precisely prescribed the information attorneys could place in
printed advertisements. Id. at 193-96. The Committee on Professional Ethics and Respon-
sibility of the Supreme Court of Missouri (Committee) had adopted Rule 4 which stated
that a lawyer could include only the following information in a printed advertisement:
"name, address and telephone number; areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools
attended; foreign language ability; office hours; fee for an initial consultation; availability
of a schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to be charged for certain
specified 'routine' legal services." Id. at 194. An addendum to that rule prescribed pre-
cisely how an attorney could list his areas of practice, should he choose to do so. Id. at 194-
95. The rule also precisely stipulated not only what information could be included in pro-
fessional announcement cards, but also that cards could be sent to only "lawyers, clients,
former clients, personal friends, and relatives." Id. at 196.
A Missouri attorney was charged with unprofessional conduct for violating the Missouri
Supreme Court Rule because his advertisement included information that was not specifi-
cally permitted in the rule. Id. at 196-98. In addition to the information listed in Rule 4,
the plaintiff listed the states in which he was licensed to practice, and a statement, printed
in all capital letters, that he was admitted to practice before the United States Supreme
Court. Id. at 197. His advertisement also listed practice areas in language that deviated
from the precise descriptions that the rule permitted. Id. For instance, the lawyer de-
scribed his practice areas as "'personal injury' and 'real estate' instead of 'tort law' and
'property law."' Id. In addition, the lawyer included several practice areas that had no
comparable listing in the rule, such as "'contract', 'zoning & land use,' 'communication,'
[and] 'pension & profit-sharing plans."' Id. Finally, the plaintiff sent professional an-
nouncement cards to persons other than those listed in the rule. Id. at 198. For a more
extensive discussion of the Court's decision in R.M.J., see Joanne G. Caldwell, Note, Legal
Ethics-Lawyer Advertising-Advertising That Is Not Misleading May Not Be Proscribed,
50 TENN. L. REv. 175, 189-94 (1982) (arguing that in R.M.J., the Court extended the Cen-
tral Hudson analysis to time, place, and manner restrictions); Ratino, supra note 15, 753-57
(arguing that the R.M.J. Court applied a stricter standard to legal advertising than to other
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tentially misleading advertising if that information can be presented in a
non-deceptive manner.115 Moreover, the Court cautioned that, despite
the heightened risk of confusion presented by professional advertising, 6
state regulation of such advertising may not extend beyond what is neces-
sary to prevent deception.'" 7 In addition, the Court emphasized that
under Central Hudson, states imposing restrictions on non-misleading
commercial speech must assert a substantial interest and demonstrate
that the regulation is in proportion to that interest.1 18
types of commercial speech under the Central Hudson analysis); Audrey Shields, Note,
Attorney's Expanding Right to Advertise Under the First Amendment: In re R.M.J., 26
How. L.J. 281, 303-04 (1983) (arguing that, as a result of R.M.J., the public will have im-
proved access to information about legal services and lawyers will enjoy enhanced earning
potential).
115. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. Justice Powell summarized the Court's approach as
follows:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising
suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in
fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate re-
strictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States may
not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading infor-
mation, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented
in a way that is not deceptive. Thus, the Court in Bates suggested that the remedy
in the first instance is not necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement
of disclaimers or explanation.
Id.
The Court stated that an attorney's prominent statement in large capital letters that he
was licensed to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court could be misleading to those unfa-
miliar with the requirements for being admitted to the Supreme Court Bar, but that the
record below contained no finding that the statement was either misleading or potentially
misleading. Id. at 205-06. One method of reducing the possibility of deception is to re-
quire the use of disclaimers or disclosures. Id. at 201.
116. Id. at 203. The Court reiterated its assertion in Bates that advertising for profes-
sional services created "special possibilities for deception." Id. at 202. The Court ex-
plained that several factors contributed to the increased potential for deception, including
the public's relative lack of knowledge, the profession's restricted ability to police them-
selves, and the lack of any product standardization in professional services. Id. But see
Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unan-
swered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 103-09 (1985) (arguing
that deception in professional advertising is less of a problem than in other industries be-
cause professionals, like lawyers, rely on repeat business and client referrals).
117. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 207; cf Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466-67
(1978) (upholding an absolute ban on in-person solicitation, in part, because that form of
solicitation usually occurs in private and is, therefore, nearly impossible to police). The
Court subsequently has relaxed R.M.J.'s standard by requiring that a state's ends reason-
ably fit its means. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing how Fox modified
Central Hudson's "narrowly tailored" requirement to require a "reasonable fit" between a
legislature's ends and means).
118. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203-04 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980)). The Court stated that the restrictions must be
1378
1996] Legal Advertising 1379
In Bates and R.M.J., the Court provided some clarification regarding
what constitutes misleading or deceptive advertisements. 119 In Bates, the
Court established that an advertisement merely stating the prices at
which a lawyer will perform routine legal services is not misleading. 120
The Bates Court also found that neither the use of the term "legal clinic"
nor the characterization of a price for an uncontested divorce as "very
reasonable" was misleading.1 21
In R.M.J., the Court ruled that a legal advertisement listing practice
areas in terminology that deviated from language prescribed by the state
bar was not misleading.1 2 2 The Court also found that a prominent state-
ment published in large capital letters announcing an attorney's admis-
sion to the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, while
distasteful and uninformative, was neither misleading nor potentially mis-
leading.12 3 Finally, the Court held that an attorney's mailed professional
narrowly drawn and that a state "may regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the
State's substantial interest." Id. at 203; see Ballantine, supra note 9, at 139-40 (discussing
the difficulties of determining whether speech is, in fact, deceptive, and explaining how
R.M.J. supplements the Central Hudson test by adding the requirement that the Court
determine whether speech is potentially misleading); see also supra notes 8-9 (discussing
the requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be narrowly tailored and directly
and materially advance a substantial state interest) and notes 73-77 and accompanying text
(discussing Central Hudson's three-pronged analysis).
119. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,196 (1982) (addressing advertisements placed in a news-
paper and in the yellow pages of a telephone directory); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (addressing a newspaper advertisement); see also Kinsler, supra note
19, at 14 (listing the types of legal advertising that states may not categorically ban).
120. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372-73, 384. Moreover, the Court explained that states have the
authority to stipulate the types of legal services that can be advertised in a packaged group,
thereby curtailing the risks that such advertising will be misleading. Id. at 373 & n.28. In
addition, the Court stated that warnings or disclaimers may be required to prevent even an
advertisement of prices for routine services from being misleading. Id. at 384.
121. Id. at 381-82. The Court explained that most people understand that legal clinics
specialize in providing standardized services. Id. at 381. Similarly, the attorneys' charac-
terization of their price for an uncontested divorce as "very reasonable" was not mislead-
ing because it was within the price range established by the Arizona Bar. Id. at 382.
Finally, the Court found that the failure of an advertisement to inform the reader that he
could obtain a name change without a lawyer's assistance was not misleading because any-
one can perform most legal services for himself. Id.; see also supra note 15 (discussing
other examples of non-misleading legal advertising).
122. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205. The Court stated that the use of the words "real estate"
instead of "property," and the attorney's listing of "contracts" or "securities" for which the
bar had no comparable listing, "present[ed] no apparent danger of deception." Id. In fact,
the Court noted that the attorney's descriptions were occasionally more informative than
the bar's permitted language. Id.
123. Id. at 205-06. The Court noted that the record below contained no finding that this
statement was either misleading or potentially misleading. Id.
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announcement cards did not contain misleading or inherently misleading
speech.' 24
2. Newspaper Advertisements: States May Not Ban Truthful or Non-
Deceptive Advertising Containing Legal Advice
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,25 the Court found that
advertisements presenting truthful, non-deceptive information and advice
regarding a potential client's legal rights were neither misleading nor de-
ceptive. 126 In addition, the Court elaborated on what constitutes a sub-
stantial state interest under the Central Hudson analysis.127 In Zauderer,
an Ohio attorney placed advertisements in local newspapers. 128 In one
advertisement, the attorney offered to represent women who had been
injured by the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device. 129 The Office of Disci-
124. Id. at 206-07. The Missouri Supreme Court rule precisely stipulated not only what
information could be included in professional announcement cards, but it also stated that
cards could be sent only to "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and rela-
tives." Id. at 196, 198. The plaintiff sent professional announcement cards to persons other
than those listed in the rule. Id. at 198. The Court invalidated the state's rule because it
was not narrowly drawn. Id. at 207.
125. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
126. Id. at 639. See generally Whitman & Stoltenberg, Evolving Concepts, supra note
15, at 553-54 (praising the Zauderer decision because it will provide the public with valua-
ble information about their rights to bring suit); Jennifer T. Elmer, Note, Zauderer v. Of-
fice of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio: States' Rights v. The First
Amendment, 46 LA. L. REV. 923, 939 (1986) (concluding that Zauderer's affirmation of
state disclosure requirements will discourage attorney advertising); Dorothy Virginia
Kibler, Note, Commercial Speech and Disciplinary Rules Preventing Attorney Advertising
and Solicitation: Consumer Loses With The Zauderer Decision, 65 N.C. L. REV. 170, 194
(1986) (criticizing the Court for failing to establish guidelines that encourage attorney so-
licitation and advertising as a means of communicating information to consumers); Robin
M. Orosz, Note, Has Lawyer Advertising Finally Received the Protection It Deserves?, 15
STETSON L. REV. 543, 587 (1986) (arguing that in Zauderer, the Court finally lifted unnec-
essary restrictions on legal advertising); Raymond S. Sokolowski, Note, Did You Use This
IUD? Legal Advice in Lawyer Advertising: Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 36
DEPAUL L. REV. 133, 152-57 (1986) (arguing that Zauderer does not give adequate defer-
ence to states' advertising restrictions, and fails to establish clear guidelines regarding ac-
ceptable advertising standards).
127. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641-42; see infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Zauderer Court's treatment of the state's asserted interests).
128. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629-30. One advertisement informed readers that his law
firm represented drunk driving defendants, and that, if convicted of drunk driving, clients
would have their legal fees refunded. Id. Upon notification from the Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio that the advertisement appeared to offer con-
tingent-fee representation to criminal defendants, in violation of the Ohio disciplinary
rules, Zauderer withdrew the advertisement. Id. at 630.
129. Id. at 630-31. In addition to featuring an illustration of the Dalkon Shield, the
advertisement stated:
The Dalkon Shield Interuterine [sic] Device is alleged to have caused serious pel-
vic infections resulting in hospitalizations, tubal damage, infertility, and hyster-
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plinary Counsel (Counsel) filed a complaint charging the attorney with
several disciplinary violations, including a violation of rules prohibiting
self-recommendation and the acceptance of employment based on unso-
licited legal advice. 3' Relying on Bates and R.M.J., the attorney con-
tended that the Ohio disciplinary rules violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 131
The Court concluded that the advertisement was not false or deceptive
because the attorney never promised that litigation would be successful
or that he had any special expertise in handling lawsuits involving the
Dalkon Shield.' 32 The State, therefore, could not prohibit the advertise-
ectomies. It is also alleged to have caused unplanned pregnancies ending in
abortions, miscarriages, septic abortions, tubal or ectopic pregnancies, and full-
term deliveries. If you or a friend have had a similar experience do not assume it
is too late to take legal action against the Shield's manufacturer. Our law firm is
presently representing women on such cases. The cases are handled on a contin-
gent fee basis of the amount recovered. If there is no recovery, no legal fees are
owed by our clients.
Id. at 631.
130. Id. at 631-33. The Counsel charged that the Dalkon Shield advertisement violated
several disciplinary rules. Id. First, the Counsel charged that, because the advertisement
contained an illustration of the Dalkon Shield, it violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) of
the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires the dignified presentation of
information "without the use of drawings, illustrations ... or the use of pictures, except for
the use of pictures of the advertising lawyer, or the use of a portrayal of the scales of
justice." Id. at 632 n.4 (quoting OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBiLir DR 2-
101(B) (1970)). Second, the Counsel alleged that the Dalkon Shield advertisement vio-
lated DR 2-103(A) prohibiting an attorney from "'recommend[ing] employment, as a pri-
vate practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought
his advice regarding employment of a lawyer."' Id. at 633 (quoting OHIO CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY DR 2-103(A) (1970)). Third, the Counsel charged that the
advertisement violated DR 2-104(A), which provides "'that [a] lawyer who has given unso-
licited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept
employment resulting from that advice."' Id. (quoting OHIo CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBiLITY DR 2-104(A) (1970)). Finally, the complaint charged that the advertisement
failed to advise clients that they would remain liable for expenses even if their claims were
unsuccessful, thereby violating DR 2-101(B)(15)'s requirement that advertisements con-
taining contingent-fee rates "'disclos[e] whether percentages are computed before or after
deduction of court costs and expenses."' Id. (quoting OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSiBILTY DR 2-101(B)(15) (1970)). The violation of DR 2-101(B)(15) also constituted
a violation of DR 2-101(A) because failure to accurately disclose fees made the advertise-
ment deceptive. Id.
131. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 634.
132. Id. at 639-40. In fact, the Court stated that the statements contained in the adver-
tisement were "completely accurate" and "verifiable." Id. at 645. The Court stated that,
although its prior decisions on legal advertising created the possibility that states may pro-
hibit lawyers from asserting claims about the quality of their services, these decisions "do
not permit a State to prevent an attorney from making accurate statements of fact regard-
ing the nature of his practice merely because it is possible that some readers will infer that
he has some expertise in those areas." Id. at 640 n.9; cf Peel v. Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 102 (1990) (plurality opinion) (permitting a reasonable
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ment on that basis. 133 The Court then applied the Central Hudson test
and rejected the Counsel's alleged state interests13 4 as insufficient to sup-
port its ban on advertisements containing legal advice and information.' 35
Addressing the State's asserted interests, the Court quickly dismissed
the contention that printed advertisements constituted an invasion of pri-
vacy simply because the reader was offended by them.136  Likewise,
printed advertisements present no risk of overreaching or undue influ-
ence. 13  Unlike in-person solicitation, printed advertisements do not co-
erce the reader into making an immediate decision. 38
The Court also rejected arguments that restrictions on legal advertising
or solicitation were valid because they advanced the State's interest in
preventing unnecessary litigation.'39 Echoing its finding in Bates that liti-
gation is not necessarily an evil,'14 the Court rejected the State's conten-
tion that imposing a prophylactic ban on advertisements containing
inference of a "greater degree of professional qualification" from an attorney's claim that
he has been certified in a particular specialty). See generally Makar, supra note 109, at
1011 (arguing that restrictions on quality and self-laudatory claims that are not false or
misleading are inappropriate because they restrict the availability of information to con-
sumers); Thier, supra note 15, at 695 (arguing that the Peel Court seems to condone infer-
ences about the quality of an attorney's legal services based on a certification of an
expertise or specialization).
133. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 640-41.
134. Id. at 644. The Counsel apparently did not advance a specific interest to support
its rule. See id. at 639. The Court noted that the Counsel extensively relied on the Court's
decision in Ohralik, where the Court upheld a state ban on in-person solicitation because
of the inherent risks of overreaching, fraud, and invasion of privacy. Id. at 641; Ohralik v.
State Bar Ass'n, 435 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978). The Court inferred from the Counsel's reli-
ance on Ohralik that the Counsel adopted the interests asserted in that case as its own.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641; see infra notes 158-67 and accompanying test (discussing
Ohralik).
135. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641-42; Whitman & Stoltenberg, Evolving Concepts, supra
note 15, at 541-42 (summarizing the Court's rejection of the Counsel's asserted state inter-
ests); see infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text (discussing Zauderer's treatment of
asserted state interests).
136. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642. The Court commented that "[allthough some sensitive
souls may have found the appellant's advertisement in poor taste, it can hardly be said to
have invaded the privacy of those who read it." Id.
137. Id. The Court stated that a printed advertisement does not pressure a potential
client into giving an immediate response to an offer of representation because the reader
has time to reflect on the offer. Id.; see supra note 19 (discussing examples of advertising
that poses risks of overreaching and undue influence).
138. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642. The Court explained that in-person solicitation is not
only a "practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of
undue influence, and outright fraud," it also "presents unique regulatory difficulties be-
cause it is not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny." Id. at 641 (citing Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 464-65, 466).
139. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375-76 (1977).
140. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642-43. The Court explained the importance of maintaining
access to the civil legal system:
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advice and guidance was necessary in order to prevent lawyers from gen-
erating business by running false or "ambiguous" advertisements that en-
courage citizens to litigate.141 The Court stated that distinguishing
advertisements containing false or deceptive legal advice from advertise-
ments that are truthful and helpful is not inherently difficult. 142 The
Court also found that the State's interest in ensuring that lawyers commu-
nicate with their clients in a dignified manner was not substantial enough
to permit restricting the publication of a non-misleading and truthful
advertisement. 43
Finally, the Court reiterated that its commercial speech decisions were
grounded on the fundamental principle that protecting the free flow of
commercial information justifies requiring a state to bear the burden of
distinguishing false, misleading, and harmful advertising from advertising
that is truthful, non-deceptive, and harmless.1 44 Therefore, the Court
held that a state may not discipline an attorney for soliciting clients with
printed advertising that conveys truthful, non-deceptive information and
counsel regarding a potential client's legal rights.1
45
That our citizens have access to their civil courts is not an evil to be regretted;
rather, it is an attribute of our system of justice in which we ought to take pride.
The State is not entitled to interfere with that access by denying its citizens accu-
rate information about their legal rights.
Id. at 643; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 375-77.
141. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 643-44; see supra notes 104-05 (discussing the Bates Court's
rejection of the argument that legal advertising promotes fraudulent claims and adversely
affects the administration of justice).
142. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 644-45. The Court reasoned that the lawyer's statement
about the Dalkon Shield in the advertisement was "easily verifiable and completely accu-
rate." Id. at 645.
143. Id. at 648.
144. Id. at 646; see supra note 14 (outlining cases where the Court emphasized the
importance of consumer access to the free flow of commercial information).
145. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647. Likewise, the Court invalidated the Counsel's restric-
tion on the use of illustrations or pictures in legal advertising. Id. The Court found that
the illustration was accurate and non-deceptive. Id. The Court explained that the State's
interest in maintaining dignified courtroom behavior does not extend to the State's desire
to ensure dignified communications between lawyers and the public. Id. at 648; Whitman
& Stoltenberg, Evolving Concepts, supra note 15, at 542.
The Court did find, however, that the attorney's advertisement was misleading because it
failed to disclose that in contingent-fee arrangements clients are still liable for costs.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652. Moreover, the Court held that the State's disclosure require-
ment regarding contingent-fee representation had to be reasonable, not the least restrictive
means available. Id. at 651; see also Schmidt & Burns, supra note 74, at 1282 (arguing that
in Zauderer the Court acknowledged that state restrictions on even misleading advertising
must not be overly burdensome and that, if a misrepresentation is not "self-evident," the
state may be required to provide evidence of consumer deception to justify a restriction).
In her partial dissent, Justice O'Connor emphasized that professional services cannot be
likened to standardized products. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 674 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) Justice O'Connor outlined two compelling reasons why states
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3. Direct-Mail Advertisements and Solicitations
As in Zauderer, where the Court held that lawyers may publish adver-
tisements containing "truthful and nondeceptive information and advice
regarding the legal rights of potential clients,' 46 the Court held in Sha-
pero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n 147 that a state may not prohibit a lawyer from
mailing truthful and non-deceptive letters to potential clients whom the
lawyer knows to have specific legal problems. 148 The Court reasoned that
should be permitted to limit lawyers's ability to accept employment that results from unso-
licited legal advice. Id. First, the complexity and diversity of professional services result in
an "enhanced possibility" of confusing and deceiving lay persons who lack the knowledge
or experience to gauge the quality of the service being offered. Id. Second, because attor-
neys are personally interested in obtaining a client's business, their advice offered in solicit-
ing a client may be biased, resulting in a client making a decision based on incomplete
information. Id.
Justice O'Connor also argued that states have several substantial interests entitling them
to deference in regulating their licensed professions. Id. at 676-78. Lawyers, in particular,
have constitutional responsibilities justifying state imposition of stricter regulation. Id. at
676-77. In addition, states have a substantial interest in preventing fraud, overreaching,
and undue influence by lawyers who would use their "professional expertise to overpower
the will and judgment of laypeople who have not sought their advice." Id. at 678. States
also have a substantial interest in requiring lawyers to "consistently exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of their clients." Id. According to Justice O'Connor,
even if a lawyer's claims are accurate, these substantial interests permit a state to prohibit a
professional from accepting employment that has resulted from unsolicited legal advice.
Id. at 679.
146. Id. at 646; see supra notes 125-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Zauderer
decision).
147. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
148. Id. at 473-74. Shapero involved an attorney who wanted to send a direct-mail
solicitation to homeowners threatened with foreclosure. Id. at 469. The attorney sought to
have the contents of the letter approved by the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commis-
sion. Id. Although the Commission did not find the letter false or misleading, it denied
approval of the letter because a Kentucky Supreme Court Rule proscribed the sending of
written advertisements prompted by "'a specific event or occurrence involving or relating
to the addressee"' as opposed to the general public. Id. Expressing doubts about the
rule's constitutionality, the Kentucky Supreme Court replaced it with ABA Model Rule 7.3
which prohibited an attorney from soliciting business by written communication except by
"letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to
need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are
so situated that they might in general find such services useful." Id. at 470-71. See gener-
ally Kinsler, supra note 19, at 22-30 (describing post-Shapero attempts by state courts to
impose limitations on targeted, direct-mail solicitation and arguing that such attempts are
unconstitutional); Douglas Whitman & Clyde D. Stoltenberg, Direct Mail Advertising By
Lawyers, U. PITr. L. REV., 381, 399-416 (1984) (analyzing pre-Shapero state court deci-
sions addressing direct-mail solicitation); Ballantine, supra note 9, at 131-37, 143-51
(describing Shapero and proposing appropriate restrictions for direct-mail advertising);
Drecksel, supra note 82, at 535-42 (analyzing Shapero and proposing filing and disclosure
requirements for direct-mail solicitation); Kabateck, supra note 16, at 922-48 (examining
ethical considerations involving direct-mail solicitation, criticizing the Court's analysis in
Shapero, and proposing stringent restrictions for targeted, direct-mail solicitation); LaRoe,
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a state cannot disapprove a truthful and non-deceptive letter simply be-
cause it was sent to persons most in need of the offered service.14 9 Like-
wise, the Court discounted the possibility that a targeted letter might
enable a lawyer to take advantage of an overwhelmed potential client
who needs particular legal services. 150 Though acknowledging that a per-
sonalized, targeted direct-mail solicitation presents a heightened risk of
supra note 13, at 1527-53 (analyzing Shapero and predicting that the Court will find recent
restrictions on direct-mail solicitations imposed by the Texas and Florida bars to be
unconstitutional).
The validity of sending letters of solicitation was first addressed in In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978). Primus involved an attorney who was associated with the American Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU) in South Carolina but was not compensated by that organization.
Id. at 414-15. In 1973, the ACLU decided to seek an injunction against the reported prac-
tice of subjecting poor women in South Carolina to sterilization as a condition for receiving
medical assistance under Medicaid. Id. at 415. After discovering that a particular plaintiff
was willing to file a lawsuit, the attorney in Primus sent the potential plaintiff a letter
informing her that the ACLU would offer her free representation. Id. at 416. Based on
that letter, the attorney was charged with engaging in "solicitation in violation of the Ca-
nons of Ethics" and eventually was reprimanded. Id. at 417, 421. The Supreme Court
found that the attorney's action was not a personal solicitation for pecuniary gain, but was
a form of political expression and association fully protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 422, 439. See generally John R. Welch, Bates, Ohralik, Primus-The
First Amendment Challenge to State Regulation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30
BAYLOR L. REV. 585 (1978) (describing the Court's decisions in Bates, Ohralik, and
Primus and analyzing their potential impact on state bar rules governing advertising and
solicitation); Robert A. Black, Note, Constitutional Law-Attorney Advertising and Solici-
tation-In the Wake of Bates, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 166 (1978) (analyzing the impact of
Ohralik and Primus in light of Bates); Joseph P. Daly, Note, In-Person Solicitation by Pub-
lic Interest Law Firms: A Look at the A.B.A. Code Provisions in Light of Primus and
Ohralik, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309, 326-33 (1981) (arguing that, under Ohralik and
Primus, client solicitation by public interest law firms that do not charge fees remains a
constitutionally protected activity because it is not motivated by pecuniary gain).
149. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473-74. "[Tlhe First Amendment does not permit a ban on
certain speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not constitutionally ban a
particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those whom it would most interest is
somehow inherently objectionable." Id.
150. Id. at 474. The lower court found that a potential client facing legal troubles will
feel "overwhelmed" by them and be more susceptible to a targeted letter offering legal
assistance. Id. The Supreme Court noted, however, that any overwhelmed person will
lack the capacity for good judgment, regardless of whether he sees a printed advertisement
or receives a targeted letter. Id. The issue was not a potential client's susceptibility, but
whether the attorney's form of communication exploited that susceptibility. Id. For a dis-
cussion of states' attempts to restrict lawyers' ability to send targeted, direct-mail solicita-
tions to personal injury victims because such persons are particularly vulnerable, see,
Kinsler, supra note 19, at 28-29 (contending that recent state attempts restricting targeted,
direct-mail solicitation to vulnerable potential clients are unconstitutional under Shapero);
Graham, supra note 83, at 825-27 (stating that after Shapero, states will have difficulty
incorporating provisions in their regulations governing targeted, direct-mail solicitation to
address overreaching); LaRoe, supra note 13, at 1536-39 (describing attempts by the Flor-
ida and Texas bars to impose thirty-day waiting periods on sending targeted, direct-mail
solicitations to personal injury victims).
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deception,15' the Court stated that the risk of isolated abuses or mistakes
did not justify imposing a categorical ban on that form of communica-
tion.152 The Court observed that states have less restrictive means avail-
able and possess more precise methods of regulating such abuses. 153
The Court also rejected the lower court's finding that sending a
targeted letter is analogous to in-person solicitation. 154 Instead, the
Court stressed the importance of the method of communication and
found targeted letters to be more comparable to the print advertisement
in Zauderer, which can be ignored or discarded. 55 Similarly, the Court
found that targeted letters do not invade the recipient's privacy any more
151. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476. For instance, the Court stated that a personalized letter
may cause the recipient to overestimate the severity of his legal problems or to overesti-
mate the lawyer's familiarity with his case. Id. Likewise, an inaccurate targeted letter
could lead to incorrect legal advice or cause the recipient to believe that he has a legal
problem that does not exist. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. 476-78. The Court stated that states can supervise mailings and penalize actual
abuses. Id. at 476. States also may require lawyers to demonstrate the proof of any facts
asserted in a letter, or to label a letter as an advertisement. Id. at 477; see Florida Bar v.
Herrick, 571 So. 2d 1303, 1307 (Fla. 1990) (sustaining the requirement that the word "ad-
vertisement" appear on a mailing), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1205 (1991).
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that an attorney retain a copy
or a recording of any advertisement so that it is available to resolve disputes arising regard-
ing the advertisement's content. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(b),
reprinted in ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 509 (2nd ed. 1992).
For a discussion of other proposed restrictions on targeted, direct-mail solicitations, see
Rossi & Weighner, supra note 12, at 207 (discussing the Iowa Bar's direct-mail solicitation
regulations, which impose a pre-approval requirement); Ballantine, supra note 9, at 146-51
(discussing various approaches to regulating direct-mail solicitations); Kabateck, supra
note 16, at 942-48 (proposing that states require pre-approval for targeted, direct-mail so-
licitations, impose mandatory disclosure requirements, require that letters be sent only to
verifiable addresses, and impose a waiting period for solicitations to personal injury or
wrongful death victims); LaRoe, supra note 13, at 1548-53 (discussing potential regulations
that would advance a substantial state interest).
154. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474. The lower court upheld a ban on targeted mailings be-
cause they fostered increased opportunities for undue influence, overreaching and intimi-
dation. Id. A plurality of the Court, however, reasoned that "a truthful and non-deceptive
letter, no matter how big its type and how much it speculates can never 'shou[t] at the
recipient' or 'gras[p] him by the lapels,' as can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicita-
tion." Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 475-76; see Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 801
F.2d 968, 974-75 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming a lower court's injunction of a state rule prohib-
iting attorneys from sending targeted, direct-mail solicitation because the state's interest in
protecting the public from overreaching and duress is less pressing with targeted mailings
than with in-person solicitation); Graham, supra note 83, at 825-27 (stating that Shapero
creates difficulty for states seeking to include overreaching provisions in their regulations
governing direct-mail solicitation).
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than a general, untargeted mailing.'5 6 Finally, the Court reiterated the
importance of ensuring that consumers have access to commercial infor-
mation and of requiring states to justify restrictions on professional
advertising. 157
4. In-Person Solicitation: Prophylactic Bans Permitted
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 5 8 the Court held that states may
prohibit lawyers from engaging in in-person solicitation for pecuniary
gain 159 because such conduct presents an inherent danger of overreach-
156. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476. Rather, the Court stated that any invasion occurs when
the lawyer learns about the recipient's legal problems, not when the attorney confronts the
recipient with information. Id. But see Kabateck, supra note 16, at 946 (arguing that
targeted, direct-mail solicitations do implicate privacy interests and that states should re-
quire attorneys to send such correspondence only to verifiable home addresses in order to
reduce the possibility that it will be delivered to the wrong person).
157. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 478 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 646 (1985)). In her dissent, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion that targeted direct-mail solicitation presents no greater potential for abuse than
other forms of printed advertising. Id. at 481-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor asserted that a personalized letter is more likely to overwhelm the judgment of
an unsophisticated recipient who is unfamiliar with the legal system. Id. Personalized let-
ters mislead the recipient because they suggest that the sender is familiar with and under-
stands the recipient's legal problems. Id. at 482. In addition, unlike a general printed
advertisement, targeted letters are more likely to include advice designed to serve the law-
yer's pecuniary interests. Id. Finally, although targeted letters may be reviewed by a state
bar association, they usually escape peer review because they generally are not seen by a
lawyer's professional colleagues. Id.
Justice O'Connor then reiterated and expanded upon the arguments she advanced in her
partial dissent in Zauderer. See supra note 145 (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Zauderer). Discussing the Central Hudson test, Justice O'Connor offered her opinion re-
garding how the test should be applied to legal advertising. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 485-87
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). She argued that states should have considerable freedom to
ban not only "potentially or demonstrably misleading" advertising but also "truthful adver-
tising that undermines the substantial governmental interest in promoting the high ethical
standards that are necessary in the legal profession." Id. at 485. According to Justice
O'Connor, the price of an initial consultation might be a protected form of advertising
under Central Hudson, especially if the advertisement contains disclaimers about the costs
of other services. Id. States, however, should be able to ban completely all advertising for
"routine" services. Id. Such an approach, Justice O'Connor argued, would return the ap-
propriate legislative function to the states. Id. at 487.
Finally, Justice O'Connor took issue with economic arguments that favor allowing attor-
ney advertising because such arguments fail to recognize the importance of restrictions to
"preserving the norms of the legal profession." Id. at 488. She emphasized the distinguish-
ing features of the professions, as opposed to mere occupations, especially high ethical
standards and the goal of public service. Id. at 488-89. Professional advertising is simply
inimical to maintaining such high standards. Id. at 490.
158. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
159. Id. at 466-68. The Court warned that a lawyer who personally solicits clients may,
even unintentionally, "subordinate the best interests of the client to his own pecuniary
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ing, invasion of privacy, and the exercise of undue influence and fraud.1 60
The Court found that the speech component of in-person solicitation is
subordinate to the conduct involved, and, therefore, deserves a lower
level of protection.161 Emphasizing the dangers of in-person solicitation,
the Court explained that lawyers often pressure a potential client to re-
spond immediately, thereby interfering with the client's ability to make a
reasoned decision. 162 The Court stated that pressuring potential clients
into making rushed and ill-informed decisions regarding legal services is
contrary to the goal of Bates and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy: pro-
moting informed and reliable decisionmaking. 163 In addition, in-person
solicitation cannot be regulated effectively because, unlike print advertis-
ing, in-person solicitation occurs beyond the scrutiny of the legal profes-
sion and the state's ability to regulate. 16' Finally, the Court found that
the state had an important interest in curbing in-person solicitation 165 be-
interests" because "the lawyer's ability to evaluate the legal merit of his client's claims may
falter when the conclusion will affect the lawyer's income." Id. at 461 n.19.
160. Id. at 464-66. In Ohralik, an attorney personally solicited two 18-year-old women
who were injured in an automobile accident. Id. at 449-52. He approached them during
their hospital stay and then again while they recovered at home. Id. at 450-52. After the
two women dismissed the lawyer, he filed a breach of contract suit against one of them. Id.
at 452. In settlement of his breach of contract suit, he eventually received a portion of a
separate settlement that the young woman had reached with the insurance company. Id.
Both women filed grievances with the local bar association, which eventually led to the
lawyer's indefinite suspension by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Id. at 453-54. See generally
Welch, supra note 148, at 585-600 (describing the Court's decisions in Bates, Ohralik, and
Primus and comparing the states' asserted interests in each case); Anthony, supra note 18,
at 715-17 (contending. that Ohralik is too broad because not all in-person solicitation
presents risks of overreaching and undue influence); Black, supra note 148, at 181-82 (criti-
cizing the Court's decisions in Ohralik and Primus for failing to establish guidelines for
appropriate regulation of attorney solicitation).
161. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. The Court characterized in-person solicitation as "a busi-
ness transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate component." Id. The im-
mediacy of the communication and the imminence of harm justify the reduced level of
protection. Id. at 457 n.13. But see Black, supra note 148, at 178 (criticizing the Court's
characterization of "speech" as an essential, yet subordinate, component of solicitation and
arguing that speech is an "indispensable element" of all forms of solicitation).
162. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
163. Id. at 457-58; see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
emphasis on the importance of the availability of commercial information to consumers).
164. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466; see supra note 160 (presenting sources criticizing the
Court's rationale in Ohralik and Primus).
165. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-65. The Court stated that the state has a "legitimate and
important interest" in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue
influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious conduct."' Id. at 462;
see supra note 19 (describing the Court's evaluation of what constitutes proper and im-
proper forms of advertising and solicitation).
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cause such conduct is inherently conducive to overreaching 166 and the
invasion of privacy. 1 67
II. FLORIDA BAR V. WENT FOR IT, INC.
In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 161 the Court considered a Florida
Bar rule prohibiting lawyers from sending targeted, direct-mail solicita-
tions to personal injury victims or their families for thirty days after an
accident or disaster.' 69 A Florida personal injury attorney challenged the
rule,. contending that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.'
Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Shapero, the district court
found the Florida Bar's rule to be unconstitutional.17 ' The Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed.' 7 2  The Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four
decision. 173
166. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-65. The potential for overreaching is increased when a
lawyer who is "trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, in-
jured, or distressed lay person." Id. at 465 (footnote omitted). But see Anthony, supra
note 18, at 712 (criticizing the Court's prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation because
such solicitation enables attorneys to convey more information to a prospective client and
because a categorical ban ignores situations where a potential client's decisionmaking pow-
ers are not impaired).
167. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465-66. In-person solicitation constitutes an invasion of pri-
vacy because the target of the solicitation can not "avoid further bombardment of [his]
sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes." Id. at 465 n.25 (quoting Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). The conflict between privacy interests and the right to free speech
have been the topic of numerous articles. See generally Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech,
Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse in America, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV., 1135, 1188-
93 (1994) (describing the Court's approaches to protecting privacy interests by restricting
"intolerable" speech); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 89-99 (1991) (describing the inconsistent application of the Court's
captive audience doctrine); Russell D. Workman, Comment, Balancing the Right to Privacy
and the First Amendment, 29 Hous. L. REV. 1059, 1063-68 (1992) (addressing the conflict
between privacy in the home and the First Amendment).
168. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
169. Id. at 2374.
170. Id.
171. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (M.D. Fla. 1992), affd, 21 F.3d
1038 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371
(1995).
172. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom., Florida Bar
v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
173. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2373, 2381.
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A. The Majority Opinion: Finding the Florida Bar Rule Constitutional
Under Central Hudson
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion 17 4 evaluated the Florida Bar's rule
by applying the Central Hudson test.1 75 After first finding that the com-
mercial speech at issue neither misled nor involved illegal activity,176 Jus-
tice O'Connor applied Central Hudson's three-pronged analysis. 177
Applying the Central Hudson analysis, the Court examined the inter-
ests that the Florida Bar advanced in support of its rule and found them
to be substantial.1 78 The Court determined that the State had a substan-
tial interest in preserving the reputation and integrity of the legal profes-
sion by restricting activities that negatively affect the administration of
justice.179 The Court factored into this principal concern the State's inter-
est in shielding the privacy of personal injury victims and their families
against impertinent, uninvited advances by lawyers.180
174. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Breyer. Id. at 2373.
175. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376-81. Under the Central Hudson analysis, the State
must justify a restriction on commercial speech by asserting that the restriction is narrowly
drawn to serve a substantial interest, and by demonstrating that the restriction "directly
and materially" advances that interest. Id. at 2376; see supra notes 8-9 (elaborating on the
requirement that commercial speech restrictions be narrowly tailored and directly and ma-
terially advance a substantial state interest); see also supra notes 73-77 and accompanying
text (discussing the Central Hudson analysis).
176. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. Justice O'Connor provided no justification for this
finding. See id.
177. Id. at 2376-81.
178. Id. at 2376-77.
179. Id. at 2376. The Court explained that the Florida Bar rule was intended to protect
the "flagging reputations of Florida lawyers by preventing them from engaging in conduct
that . .. 'is universally regarded as deplorable and beneath common decency because of its
intrusion upon the special vulnerability and private grief of victims or their families."' Id.
(quoting In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1270 (N.J. 1992)).
180. Id. The Court noted that because the Florida Bar did not articulate an interest in
protecting the public from overreaching and undue influence by lawyers, the Court would
not consider that interest. Id. at n.1.
To support its assertion that a state has a substantial interest in protecting a potential
client's privacy, the Court relied on earlier findings that a state may protect the tranquility
of citizens' homes. Id. at 2376-77 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993); Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)). But cf
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475-76 (1988) (finding that a targeted letter
of solicitation does not implicate a potential client's privacy interest because such commu-
nications can be discarded); Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n,
801 F.2d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting attempts to compare the duress associated with
direct mailings to that which is associated with in-person solicitation by stating that "[it is
easier to throw out unwanted mail than an uninvited guest").
To establish that the protection of citizens' privacy rights constitutes a substantial state
interest, the Court mistakenly relied upon Frisby and Carey. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at
2376-77. In both Frisby and Carey, the Court addressed ordinances restricting the right of
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Proceeding to the second prong of the Central Hudson analysis, the
Court found that the Florida Bar successfully demonstrated that its rule
directly and materially advanced the asserted state interest.18 ' The Court
pointed to statistical and anecdotal evidence contained in the Florida
Bar's two-year study revealing that direct-mail solicitations to personal
injury victims immediately following an accident or disaster undermines
the public's opinion of the legal profession." 2 Because the Florida Bar
persons to picket outside residential homes and emphasized the importance of protecting
the tranquility of the home. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85; Carey, 447 U.S. at 470. In Florida
Bar, the Court's reliance on Frisby and Carey suggests that the Court is analogizing picket-
ing outside homes, from which the resident cannot escape, to the receipt of unpleasant mail
which can be easily discarded. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. The Eleventh Circuit
refused to accept the Florida Bar's attempt to equate the invasion created by a mailed
letter to protesting picketers outside one's home. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038,
1044 (1994), rev'd sub nom., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995); see
also supra note 34 (discussing the district court's rejection of this argument). Although the
Court in Carey acknowledged the importance of protecting the tranquility and privacy of
the home, the Court ultimately invalidated the ordinance banning picketing on equal pro-
tection, not First Amendment, grounds. Carey, 447 U.S. at 471. See generally Eberle,
supra note 167, at 1188-93 (discussing the Court's treatment of the privacy of the home);
Strauss, supra note 167, at 91-95 (discussing the Court's treatment of residential captive
audiences); Workman, supra note 167, at 1064-68 (analyzing the Court's decisions in Frisby
and Carey).
Finally, the Court concluded that a state has a substantial interest in maintaining stan-
dards in the legal profession. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. The Court supported this
conclusion by reference to the states' well-founded "'compelling interest"' in regulating
licensed professionals. Id. (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792
(1975)). The Court noted that this interest stems from states' authority to protect the pub-
lic health and safety. Id. (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (noting that states have "a special responsibility for main-
taining standards among members of the licensed professions"). But cf. Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647-48 (1985) (stating that the state's substantial
interest in ensuring that lawyers engage in appropriate conduct in the courtroom does not
extend to lawyers' communications with the public in the context of restricting attorneys'
First Amendment rights); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 766-70 (1976) (finding that a state's interest in maintaining
professional standards is substantial, but holding that this interest does not justify restric-
tions upon consumer access to the free flow of commercial information). For a pre-Florida
Bar argument that the Court should reassess its finding that professionalism is not a sub-
stantial state interest, see Ellen Y. Suni, Wanted: Advertising Rules for A Profession in
Flux, 59 UMKC L. REV. 809, 814 (1991). See also Jonathan K. Van Patten, Essay: Lawyer
Advertising, Professional Ethics, and the Constitution, 40 S.D. L. REV. 212,216-27 (examin-
ing the opposing arguments regarding the effect of advertising on the legal profession, and
urging members of the legal profession to examine the profession to identify and address
the real ethical problems that exist).
181. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2377-79.
182. Id. at 2377-78. Specifically, the study reported that Florida citizens found such
conduct to be in poor taste and considered it a violation of privacy. Id. at 2377. The Court
also noted that the opponents of the rule had not rebutted the results of the study. Id. at
2378; see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (describing the Florida Bar's survey
and related studies).
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intended the rule to curb this behavior and thereby improve lawyers' de-
clining reputations,183 the Court found that the rule materially and di-
rectly advanced the State's interest."8
In concluding that the Florida Bar rule directly and materially ad-
vanced the State's interest in curbing activities that have damaged the
legal profession's reputation,185 the Court distinguished its prior holdings
that mailed advertisements or solicitations do not constitute an invasion
of privacy. 186 The Court first distinguished Shapero, which held that
targeted direct-mail solicitations are constitutionally protected,'187 and
that they do not result in an invasion of privacy.' 88 The Florida Bar ma-
jority explained that, unlike the present case, Shapero did not address
directly the issue of whether targeted solicitations constituted an invasion
of privacy.189 Shapero's treatment of privacy was, therefore, "casual" and
was not controlling in Florida Bar.'9 ° The Court further distinguished
Shapero's treatment of the privacy issue as inapposite because, while Sha-
pero was concerned merely with victims' discomfort at receiving solicita-
tion letters,191 the Florida Bar was attempting to contain reputational
damage that the profession incurs when its members send offensive
communications. 92
183. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
184. Id. at 2377-79.
185. Id. at 2377. The Court based this conclusion on the Florida Bar's study indicating
the public's belief that targeted, direct-mail solicitations constitute an invasion of privacy.
Id.
186. Id. at 2378-79.
187. Id.; Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 473-78 (1988); see supra notes
147-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Shapero decision).
188. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378-79; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475-76; see also supra note
156 and accompanying text.
189. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378. The Court explained that Shapero addressed
whether direct-mail solicitations result in overreaching and undue influence. Id.; see also
supra notes 154-55.
190. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378.
191. Id. at 2378-79.
192. Id. at 2379. The Court also distinguished the present case from Shapero because
Shapero involved a blanket prohibition on all direct-mail solicitations, regardless of when
they were sent or the identity of the recipient. Id. at 2378. The Florida Bar's rule, how-
ever, banned targeted, direct-mail solicitations for only thirty days. Id. at 2374. Finally,
the Court stated that in Shapero the State presented no evidence to support its contention
that targeted, direct-mail solicitations present inherent dangers of overreaching and undue
influence. Id. at 2378-79. By contrast, the Florida Bar submitted a study demonstrating
that targeted, direct-mail solicitations invade the privacy of Florida citizens and harm the
legal profession's reputation. Id.; see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (describing
the Florida Bar's study).
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The Court also distinguished Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. ,'9
where the Court had invalidated the federal government's attempts to
ban all potentially offensive direct-mail advertisements for contracep-
tives.1 94 The Court explained that, unlike Bolger, where the recipient of
an offending advertisement could avoid the adverse impact of viewing
objectionable material by simply discarding it,' 95 the Florida Bar was not
merely concerned about citizens being offended by a direct-mail solicita-
tion in the wake of an accident. 96 Rather, the Florida Bar was con-
cerned that an offensive letter adversely affects the public's confidence in
the legal profession, which the State regulates. 197 Concern with the
"reputational harm" that results from the mere receipt of an offensive
letter shortly after an accident persuaded the Court that discarding the
communication fails to alleviate its detrimental effects.
198
Finally, the Court found that the Florida Bar's rule satisfied the third
prong of the Central Hudson test because the rule was sufficiently nar-
row.199 Rejecting the contention that the rule prevents those accident
victims who are receptive to an attorney's advice from obtaining informa-
tion, the Court explained that the public has other alternatives through
which it can acquire information about obtaining a lawyer.200 The Court
193. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
194. Id. at 61; Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379.
195. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72; see Strauss, supra note 167, at 91 (explaining that, in its
decisions involving captive audiences of mail, the Court has preferred to impose a burden
on the recipient to discard the message rather than to silence the speaker).
196. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379.
197. Id.; see supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's finding
that the Florida Bar rule advanced the state's substantial interest in protecting the reputa-
tion of the legal profession).
198. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379. The Court explained that "the harm posited by the
Bar is as much a function of simple receipt of targeted solicitations within days of accidents
as it is a function of the letters' contents." Id.
199. Id. at 2380. Noting that the Florida Bar is not required to use the least restrictive
means to achieve its objective, the Court found the rule to be "reasonably well-tailored to
its stated objective of eliminating targeted mailings whose type and timing are a source of
distress to Floridians, distress that has caused many of them to lose respect for the legal
profession." Id. The Court noted that, not only was the thirty-day ban limited in duration,
but Florida citizens had a variety of other means to learn about the availability of legal
services. Id.; see infra notes 200 and accompanying text (describing other media through
which lawyers can advertise in Florida).
200. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380. The Court noted that the Florida Bar permits
lawyers to advertise on television and radio, in newspapers, on billboards, and in the Yel-
low Pages. Id. The Florida Bar also permits lawyers to send untargeted letters to the
general population. Id.; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781-83 (1976) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (suggesting that
a restriction on pharmacists' ability to advertise prescription drug prices did not interfere
with listeners' right to receive information because such information could be obtained by
other means, such as by telephoning the pharmacist). Contra Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
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also found that rule's brief, thirty-day period of effectiveness did not af-
fect the public's ability to utilize those other methods.2" 1
B. The Dissent: Arguing That the Florida Bar Rule Fails Under
Central Hudson
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that the Florida Bar's
rule failed under Central Hudson because the State's asserted interests in
protecting citizens' privacy and the reputation of the legal profession
were not substantial. The dissent contended that the Court's decision in
Shapero precluded privacy from qualifying as a substantial state interest
in the context of direct-mail solicitations.20 2 The Shapero Court empha-
sized the method of communication,203 and found that a targeted, direct-
mail solicitation cannot invade one's privacy because it can be easily dis-
carded. 2" Likewise, the Court's concern for a recipient's sensibilities was
misplaced because the Court's prior decisions clearly establish that a state
macy, 425 U.S. at 757 n.15 (stating that "[w]e are aware of no general principle that free-
dom of speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners could come by his message by
some other means"). For a discussion of the development of the Court's recognition of a
listener's protected First Amendment interest, see Emerson, supra note 14, at 1 (arguing
that the right to know deserves constitutional protection); Pearson & O'Neill, supra note
14, at 304-06 (1986) (describing briefly the Court's pre-Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
decisions recognizing a First Amendment right to receive information); Weinberg, supra
note 3, at 733-35 (stating that the right to receive information originated in the context of
political discussions where the speaker could assert no personal First Amendment right,
and that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy subsequently extended the right to the recipient
of commercial speech).
201. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380-81.
202. Id. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was joined in dissent by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 2381.
203. Id. at 2382. Justice Kennedy noted that in Shapero the Court stated that "'[t]he
relevant inquiry is not whether there exist potential clients whose 'condition' makes them
susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious
danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility."' Id. (quoting Shapero v. Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 474 (1988)); see supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text
(discussing the Shapero Court's finding that targeted letters are more analogous to printed
advertisements than in-person solicitation).
204. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy ex-
plained that in distinguishing between direct-mail advertising and in-person solicitations,
the Shapero Court found that the dangers of overreaching and undue influence are not
present in direct-mail advertising because "'[a] letter, like a printed advertisement (but
unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or dis-
carded."' Id. (quoting Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475-76). Justice Kennedy apparently would
apply this argument to the privacy interest the state advanced in Florida Bar. See id.;
Strauss, supra note 167, at 91 (explaining that in its decisions involving captive audiences of
mail, the Court has preferred to impose a burden on the recipient to discard the message
rather than to silence the speaker).
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may not suppress a communication simply because it might offend the
listener.2 °5
The dissent also contended that the State's alleged interest in protect-
ing the legal profession's reputation was insupportable because the ma-
jority presumed that direct-mail solicitations are unethical and improper,
and have been the sole cause of the public's disillusionment with the pro-
fession.20 6 Justice Kennedy argued that, contrary to the majority's con-
tentions, direct solicitation is vital and promotes the administration of
justice by ensuring that valuable information reaches the consumer.20 7
The dissent argued that the majority permitted the State to manipulate
public opinion by suppressing important information about how the legal
system operates. 20 8
205. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 648 (1985)). The dissent also noted that this reasoning has been applied to other cases
involving direct-mail advertising. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (citing Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 76 (1983)). Justice Kennedy explained that "[i]t is only
where an audience is captive that we will assure its protection from some offensive
speech." Id. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542
(1980)). The dissent also noted that households are not captive audiences. Id. (citing
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72)). See generally Eberle, supra note 167, at 1188-93 (describing the
Court's approaches to restricting "intolerable" speech in order to protect privacy inter-
ests); Strauss, supra note 167, at 89-99 (describing the inconsistent application of the
Court's captive audience doctrine); Workman, supra note 167, at 1063-68 (addressing the
conflict between privacy in the home and the First Amendment).
206. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy ac-
knowledged that the offensive behavior of a few attorneys degrades the entire legal profes-
sion, but contended the majority assumed that targeted, direct-mail solicitations are the
sole reason that the public has lost respect for the profession. Similarly, Rossi and
Weighner noted that a 1990 ABA Survey revealed that the public's perception of lawyers
who advertised was more affected by whether a particular advertisement was dignified
rather than the medium employed. Rossi & Weighner, supra note 12, at 223-24. Accord-
ing to Rossi and Weighner, the ABA study concluded that the most responsible, effective,
and professional advertising was that which was most dignified, and that dignified advertis-
ing would benefit both the public and the profession. Id. In its 1995 report on legal adver-
tising, the ABA concluded that "the various forms of communicating legal services are not
a dominant influence in the public perception of lawyers and the justice system." ABA,
CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 141. The ABA stated that fictional and nonfictional media
images of lawyers and publicized acts of incompetence have a greater impact on the pub-
lic's perception of the legal profession than does legal advertising. Id.
207. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued
that "[vlital interests in speech and expression" are implicated when an attorney is pre-
vented from communicating with a victim to explain the importance of investigating an
incident, identifying witnesses, and preserving evidence. Id. at 2381. While less informed
people are kept ignorant of the importance of immediate fact-finding, more sophisticated
parties already have hired attorneys and investigators, who, in turn, are free to contact
victims to obtain information or seek a settlement. Id. at 2381-82.
208. Id. at 2383.
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The dissent also disagreed with the majority's holding that the Florida
Bar's two-year study satisfied the second prong of the Central Hudson
test, and attacked the study on the effects of solicitation as unvalidated,
incompetent, and self-serving.209 According to the dissent, the Florida
Bar failed to demonstrate either that its study proved the existence of a
harm,210 or that its rule directly and materially advanced the asserted
state interests.2 1
Finally, Justice Kennedy argued that the rule fails under Central Hud-
son's third prong because it is not narrowly tailored.212 Specifically, the
dissent argued that the rule suppresses more speech than necessary be-
cause it fails to consider the severity of a victim's injuries.213 The rule
also deprives all victims of potentially critical information that may be
necessary to maintaining a claim.214 Justice Kennedy also argued that
less restrictive alternatives to the Florida Bar's rule exist.215
209. Id. at 2383-84. Justice Kennedy argued that the State's summary of its study was
inadequate because it contained "no actual surveys, few indications of sample size or selec-
tion procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no discussion of excluded results."
Id. at 2384. The study also failed to provide a "description of the statistical universe or
scientific framework that permits any productive use of the information." Id.; see also
ABA, CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 73, 87 (stating that the Florida Bar survey is subject
to varying interpretations and that some of the data is incomplete).
210. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
211. Id. The dissent argued that, while the Florida Bar's study emphasized reputational
harm to lawyers, it failed to demonstrate how the rule advances the State's interest in
protecting grieving and traumatized victims. Id. Justice Kennedy specifically noted that
the Florida Bar's study did not even reflect the type of mailing that a typical personal
injury victim receives. Id.
212. Id.; see supra notes 8, 77 and accompanying text (discussing Central Hudson's re-
quirement that state restrictions on commercial speech be narrowly drawn).
213. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384-85 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy ex-
plained that persons with lesser injuries are not likely to become distraught at receiving
communication from a lawyer. Id. at 2385. Moreover, where serious injuries occur and
prompt legal representation is essential, the accident victims who are the least capable of
finding find legal help are those prejudiced most by the Florida Bar's rule. Id.
214. Id. For example, victims of less serious injuries may be kept unaware of a lawyer's
interest in their case. Id. Victims of more serious injuries may be affected adversely be-
cause they may not realize the importance of the timely development of evidence or that
they should not settle a claim without legal assistance. Id.
215. Id. For instance, recipients who are offended by receiving them can select a differ-
ent lawyer. Id. In addition, the Florida Bar could permit clients to rescind contracts within
a set period of time. Id.; see supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing methods
that states can employ to supervise and regulate legal advertising).
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III. THE COURT IGNORED AN ESTABLISHED STATE INTEREST,
ELEVATED NEW ONES, AND INVITED STATES TO IMPLEMENT
MORE RESTRICTIVE REGULATIONS ON
LEGAL ADVERTISING
A. In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. the Court Ignored an
Established State Interest in Protecting the Free Flow of
Commercial Information to Consumers
In sustaining the Florida Bar rule, the Supreme Court ignored one of
the most fundamental principles that has guided its approach to legal ad-
vertising since it decided Bates in 1977: protecting the free flow of com-
mercial information to the consumer.216 The failure of both the majority
and dissenting opinions to directly confront this issue is a glaring
omission.2 17
In Florida Bar, opponents of the Florida Bar rule argued that it would
prevent willing recipients of targeted, direct-mail solicitations from ob-
taining valuable information.218 In response to this argument, however,
the Court noted merely that the Florida Bar rule is limited in duration to
only thirty days219 and that numerous alternative methods of obtaining
information remain available to those victims who desire legal advice im-
mediately after an accident.22 ° The Court utterly failed to distinguish its
prior cases emphasizing consumers' interest in having full access to com-
mercial information.221
The dissent ineffectively challenged the Court's failure by criticizing
the majority's emphasis on the profession's reputation at the expense of
ensuring that valuable information reaches the public.2 22 The force of the
216. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977); see supra note 14 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Court's repeated emphasis on the importance of consumer
access to the free flow of commercial information).
217. See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text (analyzing the failure of the majority
and the dissent to adequately address the long-standing state interest in maintaining con-
sumer access to commercial information).
218. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380. The Respondents argued that "'[b]y prohibiting
written communications to all people, whatever their state of mind' the rule 'keeps useful
information from those accident victims who are ready, willing and able to utilize a law-
yer's advice."' Id. (quoting Respondents' Brief at 14, Florida Bar, (No. 94-226)).
219. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380-81.
220. Id. The Court noted that Florida lawyers can advertise on prime time television,
radio, and billboards, in newspapers and legal directories, and in the Yellow Pages, where
they are listed alphabetically and by practice area. Id. The Florida Bar also permits law-
yers to send untargeted solicitation letters to the general public. Id. at 2380
221. See id.; see supra note 14 (outlining the Court's previous holdings emphasizing the
importance of the availability of commercial information).
222. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
charged that the majority engaged in censorship, and that the Florida Bar rule prevents
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dissent's argument is diminished, however, because Justice Kennedy
failed to tie it to a defense of consumers' First Amendment interest in
receiving commercial information.223 As a result, the majority's failure to
address the consumer interest in maintaining access to the free flow of
commercial information regarding the availability of legal services re-
mains unchallenged.224 The failure of both the Court and the dissent to
directly confront this issue in Florida Bar effectively eliminates a substan-
tial hurdle for states as they undoubtedly will seek to justify more restric-
tive limits on legal advertising.225
B. The Court Elevates Two New State Interests to Support Restrictions
on Legal Advertising
The Court in Florida Bar not only avoided addressing consumers' eco-
nomic interest in legal advertising, but also recognized a new substantial
state interest to support the Florida Bar rule: protecting the reputation of
the state-regulated legal profession.226 This newly-established state inter-
est, in turn, is dependent on the Court's other justification to support the
Florida Bar's rule: protecting the privacy of personal injury victims from
unwanted intrusive solicitations.227 The Court, however, failed to distin-
victims from obtaining information necessary for them to maintain claims. Id. at 2383,
2385; see supra note 204 (noting Justice Kennedy's distinction between direct-mail adver-
tising and in-person solicitation). Moreover, the dissent argued that ill-informed persons
will be the most adversely affected by the rule. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2385.
223. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383. See supra note 14 (noting the Court's emphasis on
the importance of maintaining consumer access to the free flow of commercial
information).
224. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383.
225. See Moore v. Morales, 63 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 1995) (sustaining the Texas Bar's
thirty-day ban on the solicitation of personal injury victims). In Moore, the Fifth Circuit
accepted testimonial and anecdotal evidence nearly identical to that presented in the Flor-
ida Bar's study. Id. at 362-63. The Arkansas and Nevada bars also have imposed similar
restrictions. Joseph Wharton, Lawyer Advertising: Solicitation Waiting Period Upheld, 82
ABA J., Jan. 1996, at 48. Similarly, New Mexico has adopted a pre-approval screening
process. ABA CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 113. For an overview of various regulatory
mechanisms that states have implemented, see id. at 103-26.
226. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376; see supra note 179 (describing the Court's finding
that states have a substantial interest in protecting the reputation of the legal profession).
According to the Court, when the government seeks to protect the reputation of the enti-
ties it regulates, it "acts in its own interests." Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379 n.2. Protecting
this governmental interest is distinguishable from "paternalis[tic]" efforts to protect citi-
zens from offensive communications that the Court has rejected previously. Id.; see Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (rejecting as "paternalistic" the state's attempt to prohibit prescription drug adver-
tising); see also supra note 59 (further explaining the Court's holding in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy).
227. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376-77. As the Court explained, it was the invasion of
the public's privacy and resulting adverse impact on the profession's reputation that gave
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guish adequately its prior findings that a state's interests in protecting
citizens' privacy and in regulating licensed professionals are not substan-
tial enough to justify banning published or mailed legal
advertisements.228
To escape its earlier holdings that targeted, direct-mail solicitations do
not constitute invasions of privacy because they can be discarded or ig-
nored, 229 and that restrictions on legal advertising cannot be justified sim-
ply because someone may find them offensive,230 the Court declared that
it was not concerned with how direct-mail solicitations affect the recipi-
ent.23' Instead, the Court extended its concern beyond the individual and
stated that it was concerned with the harm that is caused to the reputa-
tion of the legal profession when a traumatized and grieving victim re-
ceives a targeted letter.232 The Court explained that simply discarding or
ignoring the offensive letter does nothing to alleviate the adverse impact
on the profession because the real offense that must be curtailed is the
rise to the government's interest in restricting invasive behavior. Id. at 2379; see supra
notes 186-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's attempt to distinguish the pri-
vacy interests that were asserted in Shapero and Bolger).
228. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378-79 (attempting to distinguish its finding in Shapero
and Bolger that direct-mail solicitations do not invade the recipient's privacy); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988) (finding that targeted, direct-mail solicita-
tions did not constitute an invasion of privacy); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985) (finding that a newspaper advertisement containing an accurate
illustration of an IUD did not constitute an invasion of privacy); see supra notes 136, 156
and accompanying text (describing the Court's findings that printed advertisements and
targeted direct-mail solicitations do not constitute an invasion of privacy).
229. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476 (finding that a targeted direct mail solicitation did not
invade one's privacy because it could be discarded or ignored and stating that the invasion,
if any, occurred when the attorney learned of the potential client's legal problems); cf.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (stating that a newspaper advertisement did not invade the
reader's privacy merely because some may have found it to be offensive); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 (1978) (finding in-person solicitation to be an invasion
of privacy because of the intrusiveness of the conduct and the vulnerability of the listener).
See generally Strauss, supra note 167, at 91 (explaining that the Court's decisions involving
captive audiences of mail have imposed a burden on the recipient to discard the message
rather than to silence the speaker).
230. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642.
231. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379; see also supra note 192 and accompanying text
(explaining the Court's distinction between Florida Bar and Shapero).
232. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379. "The Bar is concerned not with citizens' 'offense'
in the abstract ... but with the demonstrable detrimental effects that such 'offense' has on
the profession it regulates." Id.; see also The Supreme Court, 1994 Term, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 180,196 n.55 (explaining that the Court in Florida Bar distinguished Bolger by argu-
ing that Bolger addressed the intrusive offense itself, not the "derivative harm flowing from
the offense").
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letter's receipt.233 Emphasizing the effects on the legal profession, rather
than the victim, allowed the Court to identify a substantial state privacy
interest that justifies the Florida Bar's ban.134
C. The Dissent: An Ineffective Response to the Majority Opinion
The dissent attacked the Court's attempt to redefine the privacy inter-
est and rejected the contention that protecting the privacy of personal
injury victims is a substantial state interest.235 While Justice Kennedy fo-
cused on the Shapero Court's finding that targeted, direct-mail solicita-
tions do not present risks of overreaching and undue influence,2 36 that
criticism was irrelevant because the Florida Bar did not justify its rule
based on the need to protect its citizens from overreaching and undue
influence.2 37 Rather, the Florida Bar sought to protect lawyers from ex-
acerbating their already unfavorable status in the eyes of the public.238
Justice Kennedy blurred this distinction.2 39 Similarly, Justice Kennedy
failed to recognize that the majority was not attempting to protect the
public from receiving offensive solicitation letters because the recipient
finds them to be distasteful.24 ° The majority was concerned about the
harmful effect that a recipient's response to receiving a letter has on the
legal profession.24'
233. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379. "[T]he harm posited by the Bar is as much a
function of simple receipt of targeted solicitations within days of accidents as it is a func-
tion of the letters' contents." Id.
234. See id. Justice Kennedy alluded to this shift in emphasis when he remarked that,
while the Florida Bar study is filled with evidence of how the reputation of the legal profes-
sion is suffering, it contains no evidence that the thirty-day ban advances the interests of
those traumatized or grieving. Id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 2382-83.
236. Id. at 2382.
237. Id. at 2376 n.1.
238. Id. at 2379; see supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (elaborating on the
Florida Bar's asserted interests).
239. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Although the
dissent emphasized why targeted, direct-mail solicitations did not present risks of over-
reaching and undue influence, the dissent failed to draw an analogy as to why such commu-
nications did not also constitute an invasion of privacy. See id.
240. See id. at 2379; see also supra notes 185-98 and accompanying text (discussing the
Florida Bar Court's attempts to distinguish its findings in Shapero and Bolger that mailed
advertisements or solicitations did not constitute an invasion of privacy.)
241. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379. "The purpose of the 30-day targeted direct-mail
ban is to forestall the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession that the
practice of direct solicitation only days after accidents has engendered." Id.
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D. The Court's Finding That the Florida Bar Rule Materially and
Directly Advances Substantial State Interests Is
Fundamentally Flawed
In addition to concluding that the Florida Bar asserted substantial state
interests in preserving the reputation of the legal profession and in pro-
tecting the privacy interests of personal injury victims,242 the Court found
that the Florida Bar demonstrated its regulation materially and directly
advanced those interests. 243 The Court based its finding on the Florida
Bar's two-year study, which concluded that lawyers' reputations were suf-
fering because the public did not approve of soliciting potential clients in
the immediate wake of accidents or disasters.244 Regardless of one's
opinion of the quality or sufficiency of the Florida Bar's evidence, 245 the
underlying problem is that the Court based its decision on a public opin-
ion poll rather than on legal analysis.246
The ramifications of the Court's approach to determining whether re-
strictions on legal advertising violate the First Amendment are potentially
profound. First, public opinion data is subject to varying interpretations
and to manipulation by those administering the survey.247 In addition,
242. Id. at 2376; see supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
243. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2377-79; see supra notes 181-98 and accompanying text.
244. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376-77; see supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
245. The study's statistical and anecdotal evidence satisfied the majority. Id. at 2377-78.
The dissent found the study to be incompetent and self-serving. Id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). The ABA also questioned the interpretation of the Florida Bar's data. ABA
Crossroads, supra note 12, at 67.
The pool of responses to the Florida Bar's survey and on which the survey's results are
based appears sparse. As noted in the Respondent's brief, the study was based on re-
sponses received from only 200 direct-mail recipients. Respondents' Brief at 33, Florida
Bar, (No. 94-226). For a discussion of the types of distortions that can be found in social
science data, see Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 143-52 (1993).
246. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378-79; see supra note 27 (describing the results of the
Florida Bar's survey); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 245, at 95 (arguing that "[tihe poorly
controlled use of social science data by amici curiae may not only be prejudicial to the
parties, but inimical to sound judicial decisionmaking"). While Rustad and Koenig concen-
trate on the use of social science data in amicus briefs, their observations also are appropri-
ate when principal parties use such data. See Louis B. Schwartz, Justice, Expediency, and
Beauty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 141, 143 (1987) (arguing the use of social science data under-
mines judicial decisionmaking).
247. Schwartz, supra note 246, at 149-50 (discussing how advocates and judges can ma-
nipulate "factual" sociological data to achieve desired results); see ABA, CROSSROADS,
supra note 12, at 73 (noting that, despite the Florida Bar's contention that its survey re-
flected negative attitudes towards direct-mail advertising, the survey's data suggested vary-
ing interpretations). The ABA also observed that studies not "affiliated with regulatory
agendas" indicated the public had a more positive attitude towards legal advertising,
although "attitudes narrow as the media becomes more invasive." ABA, CROSSROADS,
supra note 12, at 75. Justice Kennedy also was skeptical of the Florida Bar's survey, criti-
19961
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:1351
public opinion is not static and is prone to constant shifting in response to
an infinite number of both real and fictional external influences.2 48
Florida Bar will have the initial effect of enabling states to commission
their own public opinion studies as support for justifying more restrictive
regulations on legal advertising. 49 Moreover, the Court's reliance on the
fickle barometer of public opinion as support for its decision to uphold
the Florida Bar's rule bodes ill for the development of an approach to
lawyer advertising that is based on sound legal principles and thoughtful
strategies propounded by the profession. 50 The Court adopted a shifting
cizing the Bar's summary of its study because it "includes no actual surveys, few indications
of sample size or selection procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no discussion
of excluded results." Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Moreover,
Justice Kennedy continued, the summary failed to describe its "statistical universe or scien-
tific framework." Id.
248. See ABA, CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 66-69, 141 (describing how fictional law-
yers portrayed on television and in movies and books significantly affect the public's opin-
ion of the legal profession). Moreover, the ABA noted that non-fictional developments
pertaining to the legal system, such as the Watergate scandal, influence the public's percep-
tion of the legal profession. Id. at 69. A more modern example of an external influence
the public's perception of the legal profession is the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Anne
Krueger, Simpson trial casts shadow over Law Day[:] Poll finds many lose faith in legal
system, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 1, 1995, at A-4 (describing how the Simpson
trial has caused many to lose faith in the justice system).
249. See Moore v. Morales, 63 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 1995) (sustaining the Texas Bar's
30-day ban on solicitation of personal injury victims). While the Texas Bar implemented its
thirty-day restriction approximately two years before the Court decided Florida Bar, id. at
360, Moore illustrates how courts likely will treat testimonial and anecdotal evidence when
considering future restrictions on legal advertising. Moore involved a Texas law that,
among other things, prohibited attorneys and certain other medical professionals from
sending direct-mail solicitations to accident victims or their families for 30 days after an
accident. Id. The district court enjoined the enforcement of the statute and, following an
expedited bench trial, found it to be an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech.
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision to the extent that it applied to the legal profession. Id. at 363-64. The Fifth Cir-
cuit found Texas demonstrated that its law directly and materially advanced a substantial
state interest in protecting the privacy of personal injury victims. Id. at 361-62. Following
Florida Bar, the Fifth Circuit based its finding on anecdotal evidence from outraged recipi-
ents of direct-mail solicitations who claimed direct-mail solicitations invaded their privacy
and exacerbated their emotional distress. Id. at 362. These witness claimed that "they
would have been better able to cope with the intrusiveness of the solicitation letters had
they not received them until at least one month after the accident." Id. at 362-63. In
addition, the Fifth Circuit relied on the testimony of "experts" who stated that solicitation
within 30 days of an accident has detrimental effects on the victim and a "30-day ban would
provide reasonable protection from many of these detrimental effects." Id. at 362. Those
"detrimental effects," however, remained undefined and unspecified. See id.
250. See supra notes 247-48 (discussing the dangers of basing legal conclusions on social
science data and public opinion polls). Recent articles emphasize the need to shift from a
strict disciplinary approach in legal advertising and toward the use of "moral suasion" to
set examples for legal advertising. See ABA, CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 136. The
ABA recently published a report outlining eighteen considerations and forty strategies that
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standard prone to many external influences and based on data subject to
many interpretations.251
IV. CONCLUSION
Florida Bar marked the first time in seventeen years that the Supreme
Court upheld a state restriction on legal advertising. To find a substantial
state interest in support of the Florida Bar's rule, the Court recognized a
new state interest in protecting the reputation of the legal profession and
redefined and elevated a state interest in protecting citizens' privacy
rights. In upholding the Florida Bar's rule, however, the Court based its
decision squarely on public opinion, and consequently ignored consum-
ers' First Amendment interest in access to the free flow of commercial
information. As a result, states now will be able to justify even broader
restrictions on legal advertising merely by commissioning their own pub-
lic opinion surveys supporting the need for regulation.
Susan Alice Moore
the legal profession should consider in its approach to legal advertising. Id. at 135-56.
Among other things, the ABA urges local jurisdictions to communicate positive client de-
velopment principles to members of the profession in order to "foster an appreciation for
dignity." Id. at 146-47; see also Rossi & Weighner, supra note 12, at 223-24 (discussing a
1990 ABA report finding that dignified legal advertising more positively reflected on both
the profession and on lawyers who advertise); Van Patten, supra note 180, at 226-27 (urg-
ing the organized bar to accept the responsibility of identifying and grappling with the real
problems facing the profession, and to "shape the ethical discussion" by addressing lawyer
conduct that falls below an acceptable level).
251. See ABA, CROSSROADS, supra note 12, at 66-69, 73 (observing that public percep-
tion of the legal profession is affected more by media images of fictional and non-fictional
lawyers than by legal advertising and that the Florida Bar's survey was subject to varying
interpretations). For a discussion of why basing legal conclusions on public opinion polls is
not proper jurisprudence, see supra notes 249-50.

